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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis seeks to determine how the Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear 
(CBRN) Response Enterprise’s urban search and rescue (US&R) elements can better 
accomplish the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
mission following a domestic nuclear attack. To this end, it poses the following research 
question: How can the DOD maximize the employment of existing CBRN Response 
Enterprise US&R capabilities to support civil authority–directed lifesaving efforts 
following a domestic nuclear detonation? Research interviews were conducted with 
federal and local civil US&R authorities that inquired about their expectations of 
enterprise US&R elements after a nuclear detonation. Additionally, an analysis was 
conducted of the enterprise’s ability to overcome the challenges presented by 
post-nuclear detonation environments when delivering this support. It was discovered 
that federal civil US&R authorities intend to use the CBRN Response Enterprise’s US&R 
elements as force multipliers, while local authorities have more ambiguous expectations 
since they receive far less exposure to the enterprise’s US&R capabilities. Furthermore, 
to improve the delivery of life-saving aid, the enterprise should enhance its capabilities to 
address the threat of fire and added challenges to the performance of US&R skills 
incurred by post-nuclear detonation environments. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise offers 
local and federal civil authorities its urban search and rescue (US&R) capabilities in the 
event a nuclear detonation traps victims in collapsed buildings.1 These assets have two 
tiers of capability: search and extraction and search and rescue.2 Located within Title 32 
Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response 
Force Packages and CBRN Task Forces, all search and extraction soldiers are trained to 
the operations level (level I) in structural collapse rescue.3 Conversely, all search and 
rescue soldiers of the Title 10 Defense CBRN Response Force and Command and Control 
CBRN Response Elements are trained to the more in-depth technician level (level II).4 
Theoretically, this system allows state-level National Guard Bureau forces to augment the 
US&R efforts of local responders quickly after an event, with heavier-equipped and trained 
Title 10 forces arriving later to reinforce the operation.5 
However, due to a lack of mutual understanding and enterprise synchronization, it 
remains unknown how the civil authorities in many major metropolitan areas and the 
federal government would employ enterprise US&R resources. Furthermore, it is unclear 
 
1 Department of the Army, Training Circular Number 3-37.51: Urban Search and Rescue 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2020), sec. Foreword, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/
DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN30224-TC_3-37.51-000-WEB-1.pdf. 
2 Chad English, email message to author, May 26, 2020. 
3 Department of the Army, ATP 3-11.47/AFTTP 3-2.79: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 
and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)/Homeland Response Force 
(HRF) Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013), E-3. 
4 Chad English, email message to author, May 26, 2020; Homeland Defense Civil Support Office, 
Urban Search and Rescuer Course Welcome Letter (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, n.d.), 2, 
accessed February 15, 2021, https://home.army.mil/wood/application/files/1816/0278/5304/
USR_Rescuer_Course_Welcome_Letter_15_Oct_2020.pdf. 
5 Government Accountability Office, Defense Civil Support: DOD Has Made Progress Incorporating 
the Homeland Response Force into the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 
Enterprise, GAO-16-599 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2016), 8, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678054.pdf; William E. Sumner, email message to author, February 12, 
2020. 
xiv 
if these elements would be able to overcome the unique challenges presented to US&R 
efforts by post-nuclear detonation environments to deliver this support. Consequently, it is 
unknown how the Department of Defense (DOD) could maximize the employment of 
existing US&R capabilities to support civil authority–directed lifesaving operations after a 
nuclear detonation. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can the DOD maximize the employment of existing CBRN Response 
Enterprise urban search and rescue capabilities to support civil authority–directed 
lifesaving efforts following a domestic nuclear detonation? 
• What are the expectations of civil authorities for the search and extraction 
and search and rescue elements of the CBRN Response Enterprise 
following a nuclear detonation? 
• How can the CBRN Response Enterprise overcome the challenges 
presented to urban search and rescue efforts by a post-nuclear detonation 
environment to meet those expectations? 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Interviews were conducted to assess the needs of civil US&R agencies during a 
nuclear detonation response. Since the enterprise must collaborate with both local and 
federal civil authorities for such a response, interviewees were categorized into two groups: 
local civil authorities and federal civil authorities. Local civil authority interviewees were 
selected from major metropolitan areas, and they were special operations coordinators for 
fire departments charged with US&R responsibilities in these jurisdictions. Conversely, 
federal civil authority interviewees were selected from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s National US&R Response System who hold the rank of task force 
leader or program manager.6 In the event of a nuclear detonation, these leaders would have 
 
6 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #9—Search and Rescue 
Annex (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 4, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/
emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-09.pdf. 
xv 
direct responsibility for coordinating tactically and operationally with CBRN Response 
Enterprise US&R assets, all while considering the strategic aims of the response efforts. 
Additionally, the challenges presented to US&R operations by a post-nuclear 
detonation environment were examined, particularly within the context of defense support 
of civil authorities (DCSA) and the CBRN Response Enterprise. The enterprise’s ability to 
overcome these challenges were analyzed and both strengths and shortcomings were 
identified. By taking this systematic, investigatory approach, recommendations were 
ascertained for maximizing the employment of existing CBRN Response Enterprise US&R 
capabilities to support civil authority–directed lifesaving operations following a domestic 
nuclear attack. 
D. FINDINGS 
Civil response agencies have authority for coordinating domestic nuclear 
detonation response at both the federal and local levels of government, so it is imperative 
for the DOD to embrace its supportive role.7 To this end, it must have a better 
understanding of the expectations of civil US&R authorities after such an event. 
Subsequently, the CBRN Response Enterprise must be tailored to meet these expressed 
needs. Doing so would allow the civil response agencies to become a force multiplier for 
civil US&R authorities, which would empower them to lead the effort to save lives after a 
domestic nuclear detonation. 
For federal civil US&R authorities, force multiplication means providing capable 
manpower to sustain US&R efforts in a post-nuclear detonation environment based on 
interviews with Director Jeff Sanders on December 4, 2020, Program Manager Thomas 
Neal on December 10, 2020, and Task Force Leader Mike Kenny on January 20, 2021. 
These responders are well trained and highly experienced; thus, they are very capable of 
coordinating federal response efforts. However, according to the interviews with Sanders 
and Neal, the restrictions of work/rest cycles and stay times make US&R extremely labor 
 
7 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 4; Department of Homeland Security, NIMS: Frequently 
Asked Questions (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, n.d.), 2, accessed December 15, 
2020, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/nimsfaqs.pdf. 
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intensive under such conditions. Consequently, they expect the enterprise to integrate into 
their response to maintain their battle rhythm. 
On the other hand, local civil US&R authorities are less sure of their needs and 
expectations. They have far less exposure to the CBRN Response Enterprise’s US&R 
elements, and they dedicate fewer planning resources to domestic nuclear detonation 
response. Regardless, based on interviews with Division Chief Kevin Jones on July 28, 
2020, Private Jacob (Jake) Hoffman on December 27, 2020, and Battalion Chief Craig 
Cooper, on January 15, 2020, they are also highly trained and experienced responders, and 
they are open to military aid. 
Based upon this feedback, the DOD can begin to reshape its US&R response 
doctrine. However, even with this deeper understanding, certain conditions are presented 
by post-nuclear detonation environments that the enterprise must address to render aid 
effectively. These conditions include the threat of fire and added challenges to the 
performance of US&R skills while utilizing personal protective equipment (PPE), which 
can be mitigated by changes in gear and training. 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) Consider Embracing the “Super Squad” Concept 
As suggested by Kenny in the interview, this concept involves the direct embedding 
of enterprise US&R personnel into national US&R response system rescue squads. 
(2) Emphasize Operations-Level (Level I) US&R Skills 
With the added complexities presented to US&R efforts by post-nuclear detonation 
environments, it should not be assumed that US&R-capable soldiers and airmen will be 
able to perform at an advanced level after a nuclear attack. Therefore, the enterprise should 
emphasize mastery of operations-level (level I) US&R skills among all US&R elements. 
(3) Emphasize Wide Area Search Training 
The enterprise should place greater emphasis on wide area search training, as wide 
area search is relatively less technical in nature, more suited for light damage zone 
xvii 
operations, and a potential gap in preparedness and planning for civil US&R authorities, 
as also noted in the interview with Sanders.8 
(4) Require Soldiers and Airmen to Practice US&R Skills in CBRN PPE during 
Initial, Individual Training 
Considering the limitations on dexterity and vision incurred by PPE, CBRN 
Response Enterprise soldiers and airmen should have the opportunity to practice relevant 
US&R skills in full PPE during initial training.9 
(5) Issue Self-Contained Breathing Apparatuses to all CBRN Response 
Enterprise US&R Elements 
Given the prevalence of fire in post-nuclear detonation environments, all enterprise 
US&R forces should have immediate access to self-contained breathing apparatuses. 
(6) Improve Communication with Federal and Local Civil US&R Authorities 
Across all levels of incident response, misconceptions exist about the CBRN 
Response Enterprise’s US&R capabilities and response doctrine. Furthermore, from the 
research interviews, it is apparent that local US&R authorities have far less interaction with 
the enterprise than their federal counterparts do. Consequently, as stated in the interviews 
with Jones, Hoffman, and Cooper, they struggled to articulate their expectations of the 
DOD, as they had little understanding of its capabilities. Since Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities is the DOD’s mandate, it bears the responsibility for engaging these authorities 
and rectifying any misunderstandings.10 
 
8 Urban Search & Rescue, Wide Area Search: (PER213) (College Station, TX: Texas Engineering 
Extension Service, n.d.), accessed January 20, 2021, http://www.riccorp.com/psani/Ric5.pdf; “Damage 
Zones, Radiations Zones and Likely Rescue Activities after a Nuclear Detonation: Table,” U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services Radiation Emergency Medical Management, accessed January 23, 2021, 
https://www.remm.nlm.gov/zoned_approach_table.htm.  
9 Mehdi Pourmoghani, “Effects of Gloves and Visual Acuity on Dexterity,” Scholar Commons, April 
9, 2004, https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2204&context=etd; Arthur Johnson, 
“Respirator Masks Protect Health but Impact Performance: A Review,” Journal of Biological Engineering 
10, no. 4 (February 9, 2016), https://jbioleng.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13036-016-0025-4. 
10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3125.01D, CJCSI 3125.01D 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015), 2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/
Instructions/3125_01.pdf?ver=7vpntUK9kYgjWqyrDMf0jg%3d%3d. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is far better to grasp the universe as it really is than to persist in delusion, 
however satisfying and reassuring.  
—Carl Sagan 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Triggered by the spike in concern for chemical biological radiological nuclear
(CBRN) terrorism during the 1990s, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act of 1997 mandated that 
the Department of Defense (DOD) take a leading role in preparing civil authorities for 
domestic CBRN incident response.1 Today, organized under United States Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM) and the National Guard Bureau, DOD forces are assigned the 
mission to provide support to civil authority initiatives during weapons of mass destruction 
incidents through the CBRN Response Enterprise.2 Composed of both Title 32 National 
Guard and Title 10 federal forces, the enterprise is organized into a progressive response 
matrix, intended to deliver life-saving aid to civil authorities during CBRN incidents in a 
timely manner.3 
The CBRN Response Enterprise offers local and federal civil authorities its urban 
search and rescue (US&R) capabilities in the event a nuclear detonation traps victims in 
collapsed buildings.4 These assets have two tiers of capability, search and extraction and 
search and rescue.5 Located within Title 32 Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and 
High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP) and CBRN Task 
Forces, all search and extraction soldiers are trained to the operations level (level I) in 
1 “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997,” Congressional Record Daily Edition—
Senate, 142, no. 97 (June 27, 1996): S7074, ProQuest. 
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
Response (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2016), C-1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/
Doctrine/pubs/jp3_41.pdf. 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, C-1—C-2. 
4 Department of the Army, Training Circular Number 3-37.51: Urban Search and Rescue 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2020), sec. Foreword, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/
DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN30224-TC_3-37.51-000-WEB-1.pdf. 
5 Chad English, email message to author, May 26, 2020. 
2 
structural collapse rescue.6 Conversely, all search and rescue soldiers of the Title 10 
Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) and Command and Control CBRN Response 
Elements (C2CRE) are trained to the more in-depth technician level (level II).7 
Theoretically, this system allows state-level National Guard Bureau forces to augment the 
US&R efforts of local responders quickly after an event, with heavier-equipped and trained 
Title 10 forces arriving later to reinforce the operation.8 
Since no nuclear detonation or similar-sized CBRN event has occurred in the 
United States to require a full-scale CBRN Response Enterprise activation, any evaluation 
of the efficacy of this model is speculative, at best. Further, while frequent exercises are 
conducted to assess the US&R readiness of CBRN Response Enterprise units, they are 
conducted with minimal input from civilian emergency planners and responders. Given 
that the DOD’s Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission is to assist—not 
replace—local authorities, prior planning and collaboration is essential for the efficient use 
of US&R assets.9 However, it remains unknown how the civil authorities in many major 
metropolitan areas and the federal government would employ enterprise US&R resources 
due to a lack of mutual understanding and enterprise synchronization. Consequently, it is 
unknown how the DOD could maximize the employment of existing US&R capabilities to 
support civil authority–directed lifesaving operations after a nuclear detonation. 
Additionally, it is unclear if the search and extraction and search and rescue forces 
of the CBRN Response Enterprise would be capable of meeting the expectations of civil 
 
6 Department of the Army, ATP 3-11.47/AFTTP 3-2.79: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 
and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)/Homeland Response Force 
(HRF) Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2013), E-3. 
7 Chad English, email message to author, May 26, 2020; Homeland Defense Civil Support Office, 
Urban Search and Rescuer Course Welcome Letter (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, n.d.), 2, 
accessed February 15, 2021, https://home.army.mil/wood/application/files/1816/0278/5304/
USR_Rescuer_Course_Welcome_Letter_15_Oct_2020.pdf. 
8 Government Accountability Office, Defense Civil Support: DOD Has Made Progress Incorporating 
the Homeland Response Force into the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response 
Enterprise, GAO-16-599 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2016), 8, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678054.pdf; William E. Sumner, email message to author, February 12, 
2020. 
9 Bert B. Tussing and Robert McCreight, Introduction to Homeland Defense and Defense Support of 
Civil Authorities (DSCA): The U.S. Military’s Role to Support and Defend (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 
2015), 140-41. 
3 
authorities during post-nuclear detonation US&R efforts. Such operations are highly 
technical and require advanced levels of skill in rope, confined space, trench, vehicle, 
machinery, and structural collapse rescue techniques.10 While all search and extraction 
team members of the CBRN Response Enterprise attend a 12-day course that culminates 
in structural collapse rescue operations, and all search and rescue-capable soldiers and 
airmen attend a full structural collapse technician course, these skills are only revisited 
during occasional collective training events, 24–36-month external evaluations, and large 
exercises.11 The added challenges of performing these techniques in a contaminated 
environment are not factored into introductory training, continuing education, or response 
doctrine. Even professional rescuers, which may train on these skills for decades over the 
course of their public service careers, may struggle to perform basic US&R techniques 
under the added stress, sensory deprivation, and layers of complexity imposed by CBRN 
personal protective equipment (PPE) and other hazard control measures. Therefore, the 
challenges presented to military US&R support by post-nuclear detonation environments 
must be factored into any assessment of CBRN Response Enterprise search and extraction 
and search and rescue capabilities. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can the DOD maximize the employment of existing CBRN Response 
Enterprise urban search and rescue capabilities to support civil authority–directed 
lifesaving efforts following a domestic nuclear detonation? 
 
10 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1670: Standard on Operations and Training for 
Technical Search and Rescue Incidents (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2017), 16, 
https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/
detail?code=1670. 
11 Homeland Defense Civil Support Office, Urban Search and Rescue Extractor Course Level I 
Welcome Letter (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, n.d.), 2, accessed February 15, 2021, 
https://home.army.mil/wood/application/files/7616/0278/5305/
USR_Extractor_Course_Level_I_Welcome_Letter_15_Oct_2020.pdf; Homeland Defense Civil Support 
Office, Urban Search and Rescuer Course Welcome Letter, 2; National Guard Bureau, Chief National 
Guard Bureau Manual: National Guard Homeland Response Force and Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, 
and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Package Procedures (Arlington, VA: National 
Guard Bureau, 2016), C-5, C-8. 
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• What are the expectations of civil authorities for the search and extraction 
and search and rescue elements of the CBRN Response Enterprise 
following a nuclear detonation? 
• How can the CBRN Response Enterprise overcome the challenges 
presented to urban search and rescue efforts by a post-nuclear detonation 
environment to meet those expectations? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines the conventional thought on nuclear detonations as 
it pertains to US&R and the concept of DSCA following domestic nuclear attacks. More 
specifically, it explores the topical areas of domestic nuclear attack sources and risk, 
modeling, US&R during these incidents, and the CBRN Response Enterprise. By 
understanding what the literature has to say, a starting point for a deeper analysis can be 
identified. 
While the likelihood of a nuclear attack on the continental United States has been 
heavily debated since the invention of nuclear weapons, policy and research concerning 
the sources and risk of a domestic nuclear detonation have shifted between state and non-
state threats. As early as 1976, an interagency intelligence memorandum from the 
Department of State found the probability of a foreign terrorist organization acquiring a 
nuclear weapon to be low.12 However, with much of the conventional thought on nuclear 
warfare fading into the background at the end of the Cold War, the rise of international 
terrorism at the turn of the century birthed a new emphasis on unconventional threats. 
In the years following the 9/11 attacks, a confusing dichotomy erupted between 
government and academic thinking on the nature of this unconventional threat, with 
government reports pointing primarily to non-state actors and terrorists as the future 
proliferators of nuclear weapons. In his 2008 testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Matthew Bunn called on Congress to act 
 
12 Department of State, “The Likelihood of the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons by Foreign Terrorist 
Groups for Use against the United States” (interagency intelligence memorandum, Washington, DC: 
Department of State, 1976), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/359467-2-iam.html. 
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and warned of the growing likelihood that terrorists would eventually develop a nuclear 
weapon.13 This sentiment was echoed in a 2011 Department of Energy technical report, 
which warned, “The likelihood of a single nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater 
today than at the height of the Cold War.”14  
Conversely, many scholars like Bruce Hoffman believe a nexus must exist to state-
actors for such a scenario to be probable.15 In Physics for Future Presidents, Richard A. 
Muller agrees, “In many ways, the real threat is not nukes made by terrorists but rather 
nukes made by rogue nations.”16 Approximately a decade later, government policy is 
gradually shifting to agree with this trend in academic thinking, with the most recent 
National Defense Strategy emphasizing state-actors—instead of terrorists—as the leading 
threats currently facing the United States.17 With this shift in emphasis from 
unconventional, terrorist threats back to conventional, state threats, so has the concern for 
the domestic nuclear threat returned largely to conventional weapons.18 
Coinciding with the debate over the nature of the domestic nuclear attack threat, 
many academics have questioned the accuracy of military damage and casualty predictions 
for domestic nuclear detonations. Although much of government response doctrine is based 
in Samuel Glasstone and Phillip Dolan’s “The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,” Robert 
Harney argues that military modeling based on optimum altitude airbursts has blown 
 
13 Matthew Bunn, The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism—and Next Steps to Reduce the Danger: Testimony 
for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 2008), 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/040208Bunn.pdf. 
14 Joe Kinney et al., Nuclear Incident Capabilities, Knowledge & Enabler Leveraging (Aiken, SC: 
Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, 2011), 1, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc833884/m2/
1/high_res_d/1012545.pdf.  
15 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 296. 
16 Richard A. Muller, Physics for Future Presidents: The Science behind the Headlines (New York: 
Norton, 2009), 41. 
17 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of 
America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2018), 1, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf. 
18 Congressional Research Service, Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—
Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R43838 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), 
sec. Summary, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf. 
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damage and casualty predictions drastically out of proportion, as a terrorist or rogue state 
nuclear attack is most likely to come in the form of a surface blast.19 He is not the only 
academic to disagree fundamentally with established military thought, as Lynn Eden 
blames blinding organizational hubris for the failure to address thermonuclear effects in 
nuclear defense planning proportionately.20 However, in a letter to the editor of Homeland 
Security Affairs, Rocco Casagrande et al. challenge Harney’s models and casualty 
estimates by suggesting that the secrecy of federal response plans may have led Harney to 
incorrect conclusions.21 Further, in a study sponsored by Lawrence Livermore National 
Labs, R. E. Marrs, W. C. Moss, and B. Whitlock challenged the idea that the thermal effects 
of fire can be accurately modeled in urban surface blast detonations.22 Although many 
academics have questioned their efficacy, military models of nuclear effects have remained 
largely unchanged since the advent of nuclear weapons. 
Just as predictive discrepancies exist in nuclear detonation modeling, institutional 
differences exist between civil and military US&R response doctrine for CBRN incidents. 
According to Tussing and McCreight, CBRN Response Enterprise doctrine focuses on a 
quick response by operations-level personnel, followed later by technician-level soldiers.23 
In contrast, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s US&R teams respond 
with highly experienced, technician-level rescuers.24 As Henry Willis et al. point out in a 
 
19 Samuel Glasstone and Phillip J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense and Department of Energy, 1977); Robert C. Harney, “Inaccurate Prediction of 
Nuclear Weapons Effects and Possible Adverse Influences on Nuclear Terrorism Preparedness,” Homeland 
Security Affairs 5, art. 3 (September 2009), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/97. 
20 Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
21 Rocco Casagrande et al., “Letter to the Editor: Federal Nuclear Preparedness and Response 
Measures Reflect New Modeling Paradigms,” Homeland Security Affairs 6, art. 9 (January 2010), 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/588.  
22 R. E. Marrs, W. C. Moss, and B. Whitlock, Thermal Radiation from Nuclear Detonations in Urban 
Environments (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2007). 
23 Tussing and McCreight, Introduction to Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities, 139-65. 
24 John Norman, Fire Department Special Operations (Tulsa, OK: PennWell Corporation, 2009), 18-
19; Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Urban Search and Rescue Response System US&R 
Operations Manual Annex E—Position Descriptions (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
2020), 23. 
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report for RAND, differences in levels of training can cause problems, as can equipment 
interoperability between departments and agencies.25 The experts on this topic seem to 
agree that this converging nexus of structural collapse and hazardous materials response 
needs to be studied. In CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public Events: Planning and 
Response, Dan Kaszeta says, “While most USAR efforts acknowledge that hazardous 
materials of various descriptions may be present in structural-collapse scenarios, not many 
organizations have taken on the task of both USAR and CBRN concurrently. This area 
represents an operational-capability deficit in many places.”26 
Accordingly, many military scholars have recognized shortcomings in the CBRN 
Response Enterprise, particularly in the realm of US&R, and several have made 
recommendations for improvement. When Kaszeta wrote CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at 
Major Public Events: Planning and Response in 2013, US&R was still a developing 
concept in the CBRN Response Enterprise. He pointed out the lack of real-world 
deployments by which to evaluate this endeavor, saying, “In several cases, CERFPs seem 
to be taking the Urban Search and Rescue mission seriously in CBRN environments, which 
is a useful development. Just how well the CST and CERFP will perform in a large-scale 
CBRN incident is a matter of conjecture, but it seems to me that their presence is far better 
than their absence.”27 While Kaszeta’s conclusion was relatively positive, others have 
arrived at more negative conclusions. In Reassessing the Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear Response Enterprise, Gray Mills concluded the enterprise should 
“discontinue any technical search and rescue training within the CRE due to duplicate 
capabilities, specifically the already existent 28 FEMA urban search and rescue task forces 
and the large number of Type 1 and 2 certified teams within the nation’s fire 
departments.”28 
 
25 Henry H. Willis et al., Protecting Emergency Responders: Personal Protective Equipment 
Guidelines for Structural Collapse Events, vol. 4 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), 65-66.  
26 Dan Kaszeta, CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public Events: Planning and Response 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2013), 379. 
27 Kaszeta, 181. 
28 Gary Mills, Reassessing the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Response Enterprise (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Army School for Advanced Military Studies, 2018), 37, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/
AD1071195.pdf. 
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From perceptions and analyses of the risk of a domestic nuclear attack to the 
development of response doctrine, a spirited debate has occurred among the CBRN 
response community about how to prepare for this threat. A lack of consensus has revealed 
a gap between military and civilian response doctrine, which may render a real-world 
response unorganized and ineffective. Since it is the DOD’s duty to support civil authority-
led US&R efforts during a nuclear detonation event, examining the intentions of local and 
federal civil responders for the employment of DOD US&R capabilities may offer insights 
that will bridge this gap while allowing the DOD to prepare for its supportive role better. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Viewed conventionally, the CBRN Response Enterprise’s planned approach to 
US&R after a nuclear detonation is a matter of military doctrine. This doctrine was built 
upon decades-old assumptions about nuclear blast effects and how DOD assets would be 
utilized and integrated into a response. However, as Eden discovered in Whole World on 
Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, & Nuclear Weapons Devastation, such assumptions do 
not always reflect reality.29 Therefore, this study investigates the validity of the 
assumptions that have shaped the enterprise’s US&R doctrine and seeks recommendations 
for improvement. 
While policy analysis could have proven beneficial for discovering how the CBRN 
Response Enterprise’s US&R assets could be better integrated into domestic nuclear 
detonation responses, it would have failed to reflect the dynamic, unprecedented nature of 
a nuclear detonation accurately. Since an emergency response to a domestic nuclear 
detonation has never actually occurred, such an event would push even the best conceived 
emergency response plans to their limits. Lacking a history of responses to draw inferences 
and lessons from, civil US&R authorities will be left to improvise as unanticipated 
challenges arise. For this reason, it was deemed more advantageous to speak with the civil 
authorities that would be leading such a response. To this end, interviews were conducted 
to assess the needs of civil US&R agencies during a nuclear detonation response. By doing 
 
29 Eden, Whole World on Fire, 283-304. 
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so, recommendations for improving CBRN Response Enterprise US&R doctrine were 
ascertained. 
As the enterprise must collaborate with both local and federal civil authorities for 
such a response, interviewees were categorized into two groups, local civil authorities and 
federal civil authorities. Given the high propensity for damage and casualties, major cities 
are among the most vulnerable targets to a nuclear attack.30 Thus, local civil authority 
interviewees were selected from major metropolitan areas. While this selection limits the 
implications of the study, as suburban and rural jurisdictions may have vastly different 
perspectives, capabilities, and needs, it ensures the results are relevant to some of 
America’s most susceptible targets. Further, interviewees in this group were special 
operations coordinators for fire departments charged with US&R responsibilities in these 
jurisdictions. This selection ensured the interviewees had direct knowledge of the tactical, 
operational, and strategic realms of their agency’s plans, policies, and response doctrine. 
Since FEMA is designated to lead the federal US&R response to any such event, 
FEMA’s National US&R Response System leaders comprised the second group of 
interviewees.31 While the system has an oversight office in FEMA headquarters, from 
which interviewees could have been selected for questions of strategy and policy, the 
information sought by this study was just as much tactical and operational as it was 
strategic.32 Therefore, the FEMA US&R representatives selected for interview held the 
rank task force leader or program manager. In the event of a nuclear detonation, these 
leaders would be directly responsible for coordinating tactically and operationally with 
CBRN Response Enterprise US&R assets, all while considering the strategic aims of the 
response efforts. 
 
30 National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness & 
Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats, Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation 
(Washington, DC: National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness 
& Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats, 2010), 8. 
31 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Support Function #9—Search and Rescue 
Annex (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2019), 4, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/
emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-09.pdf. 
32 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National US&R Response System Administrative 
Manual: Annex A—Advisory Organization (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 1, 
https://www.responsesystem.org/advisory-orgaization. 
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Finally, the challenges presented to US&R operations by a post-nuclear detonation 
environment were examined, particularly within the context of defense support of civil 
authorities (DCSA) and the CBRN Response Enterprise. The enterprise’s ability to 
overcome these challenges were analyzed to identify both strengths and shortcomings. By 
taking this systematic, investigatory approach, recommendations were ascertained for 
maximizing the use of existing CBRN Response Enterprise US&R capabilities to support 
civil authority–directed lifesaving operations following a domestic nuclear attack. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Following this introduction, Chapter II outlines and analyzes the nation’s US&R 
response architecture for domestic nuclear detonations as it pertains to the CBRN Response 
Enterprise. From this evaluation, gaps are identified in the DOD’s understanding of the 
needs and expectations of civil US&R authorities. Moving forward, Chapter III details the 
research interviews conducted to begin bridging these gaps in understanding. 
Collectively, the findings of Chapters II and III lead into Chapter IV, which takes 
a deeper look at the challenges presented to military US&R support by post-nuclear 
detonation environments. After detailing these obstacles, it critically examines the 
enterprise’s ability to overcome them to accomplish its DSCA mission. Finally, based upon 
the implications of these previous sections, Chapter V draws conclusions and makes 
subsequent recommendations to the DOD for maximizing the employment of existing 
CBRN Response Enterprise US&R capabilities to support civil authority–directed 
lifesaving operations following a domestic nuclear detonation. 
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II. URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE RESPONSE AFTER A 
DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETONATION 
Of each particular thing, ask: What is in it itself, in its own construction?  
—Marcus Aurelius 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter of this thesis laid out a road map for following and 
understanding the progression of this study and identified its objectives and components in 
sequential order. In keeping with this systematic approach, this chapter outlines the US&R 
response architecture to domestic nuclear detonations in the United States. It identifies and 
discusses this system’s components at both the federal and local levels by examining them 
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of incident response. By doing so, this 
chapter exposes the DOD’s gap in understanding of the expectations of civil US&R 
authorities following a domestic nuclear detonation. 
B. THE 10 KILOTON DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETONATION THREAT 
As it is the origin of most current emergency planning, preparedness, and response 
doctrine, the natural starting point for an examination of any component of the domestic 
nuclear detonation response architecture is the 10 kiloton, surface blast nuclear detonation 
threat.33 In the recent past, it was more specifically described as a 10 kiloton improvised 
nuclear device (IND), which echoed the government concerns of nuclear terrorism after 
the attacks of September 11, 2001.34 The precise origin of this policy and doctrine can be 
found in the Homeland Security Council’s National Planning Scenario 1, which addressed 
a domestic 10 kiloton IND detonation.35 This scenario served as a starting point for 
 
33 National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness & 
Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats, Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, 
11. 
34 National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness & 
Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats, 9; Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 285-87. 
35 Homeland Security Council, National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries (Washington, DC: 
Homeland Security Council, 2005), 1-1—1-5, https://ia801603.us.archive.org/23/items/
NationalPlanningScenariosExecSummariesVer2/National_Planning_Scenarios_ExecSummaries_ver2.pdf. 
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preparedness and planning in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-
8, which led it to drive America’s domestic nuclear security initiatives.36 
With the reemergence of great power competition, the domestic nuclear attack 
threat has shifted back to conventional nuclear weapons.37 Generally speaking, these 
weapons are far greater in power.38 Therefore, it is fair to question if the 10 kiloton, surface 
blast IND threat is still relevant for domestic planning and preparedness policy. After all, 
this threat is the center point of response doctrine in the CBRN Response Enterprise.39 
Emergency Manager Brooke Buddemeier addressed this question in his 2019 
FEMA PrepTalk Saving Lives after a Nuclear Detonation. A certified health physicist with 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Buddemeier has been considered a leading 
expert on domestic nuclear detonation response and modeling for well over a decade.40 In 
his lecture, he compared a 10-kiloton device to a 100-kiloton weapon, stating, “Even when 
yields change by a factor of 10…blast effect ranges only change by a factor of 2.” He 
concluded, “It’s definitely bigger, but the range of effect is only about twice as far.”41 
Figure 1 illustrates this proportionality, albeit for detonations smaller in force. While other 
factors can be considered in answering this question, an in-depth comparative analysis of 
predictive nuclear effects models is beyond the scope of this thesis. Concerning the matters 
being examined in this study, it is relatively safe to assume the return of conventional 
nuclear threats has not necessarily rendered obsolete the policy and doctrine developed 
over the past decade. 
 
36 Homeland Security Council, iii. 
37 Congressional Research Service, Renewed Great Power Competition, 4. 
38 Muller, Physics for Future Presidents, 32-37; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Improvised 
Nuclear Device Response and Recovery: Communicating in the Immediate Aftermath (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 25, https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/
33036?id=7659G. 
39 United States Northern Command, USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500-14: Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities Response (Colorado Springs, CO: United States Northern Command, 2014), C-1—B-30. 
40 “Brooke Buddemeier, CHP, MS, BS,” Harvard T. H. Chan School of Public Health, accessed 
February 18, 2021, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/ecpe/faculty/brooke-buddemeier/. 
41 “PrepTalks: Brooke Buddemeier “Saving Lives after a Nuclear Detonation,”“ February 26, 2019, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, video, 23:10, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EueJrCJ0CcU. 
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Figure 1. Comparison of Projected Damage Zones.42 
In the year 2020, it appears the United States must have effective response plans to 
address both conventional and unconventional nuclear threats, as these threat landscapes 
undergo cycles. International terrorism has waned for now, apparently taking the IND 
threat with it. However, the overall domestic nuclear threat has not diminished, with a great 
power competition renewing Cold War-era concerns of nuclear attack.43 Fortunately, the 
response policy and doctrine developed in the age of international terrorism still has some 
relevance today. 
C. THE CBRN RESPONSE ENTERPRISE 
Since the purpose of this study is to research ways the CBRN Response Enterprise 
can maximize the employment of its US&R assets after a domestic nuclear detonation, the 
enterprise’s purpose and organization must next be discussed. Within the DOD, the CBRN 
Response Enterprise is an amalgam of Title 32 National Guard Bureau and Title 10 
 
42 Source: National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness & 
Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats, Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, 
20. 
43 Congressional Research Service, Renewed Great Power Competition, 4. 
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NORTHCOM assets that have been organized into a progressive response matrix to assist 
civil authorities in the event of a CBRN incident within the borders of the United States 
and its territories, as shown in Figure 2.44 On the Title 32 side, it is comprised of 57 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST), 17 CERFPs, and 10 
homeland response forces (HRF) that total approximately 56% of the enterprise at 10,595 
soldiers and airmen. On the Title 10 side, it is composed of the DCRF and two C2CREs 
that total 44% of the enterprise at roughly 8,200 soldiers and airmen.45 Theoretically, this 
combination of National Guard and active duty resources means Title 32 forces can be 
mobilized quickly to an event at a state government level, with Title 10 forces sustaining 
the effort once federal aid is formally requested.46 Exceptions to this response order do 
occur, and elements of the enterprise have the ability to respond internationally if requested 
by the Department of State, but these instances are irrelevant for the purposes of this 
study.47 
 
44 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41, C-1. 
45 Government Accountability Office, Defense Civil Support, 6; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 
Publication 3-41, C-2. 
46 Government Accountability Office, 8. 
47 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41, I-2. 
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Figure 2. The CBRN Response Enterprise.48 
According to the response matrix, when CBRN Response Enterprise capabilities 
are requested for an incident, the first enterprise assets to arrive are usually the WMD-
CSTs.49 Located in each state and three territories, the mission of these small teams during 
a CBRN event is to determine the nature and extent of the CBRN hazard, called site 
characterization.50 In the case of a nuclear detonation, included would be atmospheric 
monitoring to determine the locations and energy levels of radiation fields.51 For enterprise 
 
48 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41, C-2. 
49 United States Northern Command, USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500-14, C-1—B-21. 
50 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATP3-11.46/AFTTP 3-2.81: Weapons of Mass Destruction-
Civil Support Team Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), 1-1, I-2, 
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN20836_ATP_3-
11x46%20_C2_FINAL_WEB.pdf; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41, C-3.  
51 Federal Emergency Management Agency, WMD Radiological/Nuclear Course for Hazardous 
Materials Technicians PER-241: Participant Guide, 6.4 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 
Security, 2010), 293. 
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US&R assets, this action helps determine the protective measures to be used during rescue 
efforts.52 
The next arriving resources are the CERFPs, composed of search and extraction, 
decontamination, medical, fatality search and recovery, and command and control 
elements.53 Since the WMD-CSTs do not have any US&R capabilities, the search and 
extraction teams of the CERFPs are the first CBRN Response Enterprise US&R 
capabilities in the order of arrival.54 As stated previously, they are trained to at least the 
operations level (level I) in rope, confined space, and structural collapse rescue.55 
Following the CERFPs are the HRFs, which are located in each FEMA region of 
the United States.56 Each HRF consists of the same elements as a CERFP, plus a regional 
command and control element and a CBRN assistance and support element, which is 
responsible for security.57 The CERFP-related elements of a HRF are called a CBRN Task 
Force, and they bring additional search and extraction capabilities to the incident.58 
The first Title 10 resource to arrive is the DCRF, composed of operations, aviation, 
medical, logistics, and signal task forces.59 The operations task force is comprised of three 
battalion-equivalent task forces, including search and rescue personnel trained to the 
technician level (level 2) in all the US&R disciplines outlined by the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) to be recognized as a structural collapse technician.60 
These disciplines include rope, confined space, vehicle, machinery, trench, and structural 
 
52 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATP3-11.46/AFTTP 3-2.81, 1-3—1-4. 
53 Department of the Army, ATP 3-11.47/AFTTP 3-2.79, 2-2. 
54 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41, C-2. 
55 Department of the Army, ATP 3-11.47/AFTTP 3-2.79, E-3. 
56 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41, C-4. 
57 Department of the Army, ATP 3-11.47/AFTTP 3-2.79, 2-6. 
58 Tussing and McCreight, Introduction to Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities, 158-59. 
59 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41, C-5. 
60 Joint Chiefs of Staff, C-5; Chad English, email message to author, May 26, 2020. 
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collapse rescue.61 Since active duty units are only assigned to the DCRF on a rotation, it 
has a full-time command and control headquarters, known as Joint Task Force Civil 
Support (JTF-CS).62 
The final resource in the CBRN Response Enterprise’s order of arrival is one of 
two C2CREs, A (Alpha) or B (Bravo). While both of these elements consist of Army 
Reserve components, C2CRE A has active duty elements, and C2CRE B has National 
Guard personnel. Both bring similar capabilities as the DCRF to the incident, including 
search and rescue forces.63 
It is worth noting that additional resources with similar missions and US&R 
capabilities as the CBRN Response Enterprise exist within the DOD, namely the United 
States Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) and the U.S. 
Army’s 911th Technical Rescue Engineer Company. However, both have special security 
responsibilities within the National Capital Region. Further, only CBIRF has a formal 
relationship with the enterprise that lends an Initial Response Force to the DCRF.64 
Regardless, both have a history of responding independently to major disasters and US&R 
events, including the Fukushima nuclear disaster and the attack on the Pentagon, and can 
be included in the DOD’s response matrix, if deemed necessary.65 
The CBRN Response Enterprise is a tiered response system that brings Title 32 
National Guard and Title 10 federal resources to bear on major domestic CBRN events to 
assist civil authorities.66 On the Title 32 end of the spectrum, it is achieved through 57 
 
61 Homeland Defense Civil Support Office, Urban Search and Rescuer Course Welcome Letter, 2. 
62 Tussing and McCreight, Introduction to Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities, 160. 
63 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41, C-5. 
64 Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-10; Austin Thomas, “911th Technical Rescue Engineering Company 
Conducts Validation,” United States Army, April 5, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/185365/
911th_technical_rescue_engineering_company_conducts_validation; United States Northern Command, 
USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500-14, C-1—B-12. 
65 “History,” Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, accessed February 17, 2021, 
https://www.cbirf.marines.mil/About-CBIRF/History/; Thomas; Tussing and McCreight, Introduction to 
Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 151. 
66 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41, C-1. 
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WMD-CSTs, 17 CERFPs, and 10 HRFs. Moving into the Title 10 end, it involves the 
DCRF and two C2CREs.67 Within these units, it supplies search and extraction and search 
and rescue personnel in a progressive manner to assist with the rescue of trapped victims 
in collapsed buildings after a domestic nuclear detonation.68 
D. US&R RESPONSE TO A DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETONATION 
With an appreciation for the underlying assumptions of current domestic nuclear 
detonation preparedness and response policy, and a deeper philosophical understanding of 
the CBRN Response Enterprise, America’s overall US&R response architecture should 
next be scrutinized. This review can be accomplished by classifying and mapping the types 
and levels of government US&R authorities, particularly as they relate to the enterprise. 
From there, the lines of authority can be drawn, relationships between agencies at varying 
levels of government can be understood, and gaps in doctrine and response philosophy can 
be identified. 
Following a domestic nuclear detonation, all three levels of American government 
are involved in the response: local, state, and federal.69 US&R assets exist at all three 
levels, and state and federal authorities can be further categorized as either civil or military. 
The Code of Federal Regulations from which they derive their authority, Title 10 and Title 
32, as previously discussed, differentiates military entities. Title 32 operates under state 
authority, while Title 10 is under federal control.70 
The response policy, doctrine, and philosophies of these organizational categories 
can also be analyzed within the context of the three levels of emergency incident response: 
strategy, operations, and tactics. These levels are defined by FEMA’s student manual for 
the ICS-300: Intermediate ICS for Expanding Incidents Course. According to the manual, 
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strategy is “the general plan or direction selected to accomplish incident objectives,” and 
tactics are the “deploying and directing resources on an incident to accomplish the 
objectives designated by the strategy.”71 Operations lie in the middle, as they are 
“responsible for all tactical incident operations and implementation of the Incident Action 
Plan.”72 
1. Federal US&R Response 
This section examines federal US&R policy and doctrine at the strategic, 
operations, and tactical levels of emergency response. Comparatively, it includes both the 
civil and military approaches. By employing this method, it highlights the holes in the 
DOD’s assumptions about the expectations of federal US&R authorities after a domestic 
nuclear detonation. 
a. Strategy 
Since strategy sets the overall heading for incident response, it is discussed first.73 
In the case of federal US&R policy and doctrine, it primarily concerns how US&R is 
defined among the interagency. It also includes the delegation of US&R response 
authorities and responsibilities, which provides a metric for judging the strategy’s 
implementation. Accordingly, this section examines the strategic components of federal 
US&R response doctrine. 
While no single, overarching definition of US&R in the context of federal 
government response strategy exists, the definitions of most relevant agencies and 
documents center around structural collapse events, and lines of authority for domestic 
US&R operations are clearly drawn among the interagency. In most federal civil response 
policy and doctrine, US&R is considered a subset of the greater search and rescue mission. 
Such is the case in the National Response Framework (NRF), the principle document that 
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outlines the authority of federal response agencies during national disasters.74 The 
Emergency Support Function #9—Search and Rescue Annex of the framework lists US&R 
as the first of three search and rescue categories, stating, “US&R includes operations for 
natural and manmade disasters and catastrophic incidents, as well as other structural 
collapse operations that primarily require DHS/FEMA US&R task force operations.”75 In 
terms of authority for coordinating these operations, the annex states, “During incidents or 
potential incidents requiring a unified SAR [search and rescue] response, federal SAR 
responsibilities reside with ESF #9 primary agencies that provide timely and specialized 
SAR capabilities. Support agencies provide specific capabilities or resources that support 
ESF #9.”76 Clearly, in the case of US&R and structural collapse events, FEMA and its 
parent organization—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—are recognized as the 
primary agencies.77 
The Search and Rescue Annex is synchronized with the U.S. National Search and 
Rescue Plan (NSP), developed by the National Search and Rescue Committee, a 
conglomerate of eight federal agencies with search and rescue capabilities under the 
coordination of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Office of Search and Rescue.78 The annex states, 
“The Federal US&R Response System integrates DHS/FEMA task forces in support of 
unified search and rescue operations conducted following the U.S. National Search and 
Rescue Plan (NSP). (The NSP is the policy guidance of the signatory Federal departments 
and agencies for coordinating SAR services to meet domestic needs and international 
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commitments.)”79 While the NSP defines US&R as “the location, rescue (extrication), and 
initial medical stabilization of survivors trapped in confined spaces,” failing to mention 
structural collapses specifically, it goes on to pair US&R with collapsed structure events 
when defining the document’s scope. Further, it, too, recognizes FEMA as both the 
coordinating agency during catastrophic events and the overseer of the National US&R 
Response System.80 Although worded differently, this synchronization prevents ambiguity 
and fosters unity of effort across the civil interagency during US&R incidents. 
With these two documents confirming FEMA’s status as the primary agency for 
domestic US&R events, the DOD has adopted a supportive posture towards such incidents 
under the concept of DSCA. Joint Publication 3-28: Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
defines this concept; it states: 
Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is support provided by federal 
military forces; Department of Defense (DOD) civilians; DOD contract 
personnel; and DOD component assets, to include National Guard (NG) 
forces (when the Secretary of Defense [SecDef], in coordination with the 
governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use and fund those 
forces in Title 32, United States Code [USC], status), in response to a 
request for assistance (RFA) from civil authorities for domestic 
emergencies, cyberspace incident response, law enforcement support, and 
other domestic activities or from qualifying entities for special events. 
DSCA includes support to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover 
from domestic incidents.81 
This supportive approach is further supported by American legal principles. 
Although the Posse Comitatus Act restricts the use of military forces domestically for law 
enforcement purposes, CBRN incidents are considered an exception.82 As such, a 
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framework for employing DOD assets during disasters is outlined by the Stafford Act.83 
Still, because domestic deployment of military forces tends to evoke mixed feelings among 
Americans, the DSCA concept formally underscores the philosophy that civil authorities 
take the lead during domestic incidents. 
Despite civil authorities having this leading role in domestic disaster responses, and 
the primarily supportive mission of the military, the DOD has its own internal framework 
for responding to domestic incidents. Much like any other department in the Executive 
Branch, authority to engage in domestic CBRN response is passed down from the DOD’s 
agency executives. In the case of the DOD, it is the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.84 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3125.01D: 
Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents 
in the Homeland is the chief policy document that outlines the DOD’s overarching role in 
domestic nuclear detonation response.85 While it only mentions search and rescue 
activities once, it is cited by the joint publications that define related DOD doctrine.86 This 
limitation can be attributed, in part, to the fact the DOD is an incredibly large agency, the 
largest department in the federal government.87 Further, military culture is characterized 
by clear chains of command and strict adherence to rules of discipline and order. While 
federal civilian agencies are no less organized, civilian culture tends to be far more 
informal. 
Consequently, a dichotomy occurs between the underlying philosophies of civil and 
military US&R policy and doctrine. While the Search and Rescue Annex of the NRF and 
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NSP speak to US&R in general terms of building collapses, they make no mention of 
US&R in the context of domestic nuclear detonations. Rather, they approach US&R in an 
all-hazards manner. As the website of the National US&R Response System states: 
Urban search and rescue is considered a ‘multi-hazard’ discipline, as it may 
be needed for a variety of emergencies or disasters, including earthquakes, 
hurricanes, typhoons, storms, tornadoes, floods, dam failures, technological 
accidents, terrorist activities, and hazardous materials releases. The events 
may be slow in developing, as in the case of hurricanes, or sudden, as in the 
case of earthquakes.88  
Military US&R response policy and doctrine, on the other hand, centers almost 
entirely around response to domestic nuclear detonations. In fact, military US&R largely 
lies under the umbrella of CBRN response, while federal civil US&R doctrine makes no 
mention of CBRN incidents or considerations. Joint Publication 3-41: Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response is the principal guiding document for the 
DOD’s planned response to any such incident. In defining the purpose of its US&R 
elements, it states: 
These elements support all capabilities necessary to search for and rescue 
casualties from a contaminated or hazardous environment. Casualties are 
usually decontaminated prior to transit from the incident site. A SAR 
element requires specialized technical rescue training to support the rescue 
of personnel and equipment from a CBRN environment using unique SAR 
equipment for an urban and structural collapse environment.89 
This disparity in emphasis makes the efficacy of the military’s overarching 
response model questionable, as an obvious gap exists in strategic policy and doctrine. 
Although the NSP declares that “military support to US&R” during collapsed structure 
events is within its scope, and the military acknowledges the supportive nature of its role 
in such incidents, its strategic policy and doctrine is not aligned with that of its federal civil 
authority partners.90 Gary Mills also concluded this sentiment in his article Reassessing 
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the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Response Enterprise. Mills concluded, 
“Currently, there is a distinct difference between the way the military plans, prepares, and 
trains for a CBRN incident and that of an ‘all hazards’ incident.”91 
b. Operations 
Since tactics are coordinated in the operational domain of incident response to 
implement strategies, the operational plans of federal US&R response entities is the next 
logical point for analysis.92 Thus, this section examines the implementation and response 
plans of relevant federal US&R agencies. In doing so, it identifies the gaps in planning and 
doctrine between civil authorities and the CBRN Response Enterprise. 
As previously noted, both the Search and Rescue Annex of the National Response 
Framework and U.S. National Search and Rescue Plan name FEMA as the primary agency 
in structural collapse events.93 FEMA is thus named because it maintains and administrates 
the National Urban Search and Rescue Response System, a confederation of 28 US&R 
teams located throughout the continental United States.94 Similar to the supportive role of 
the military’s DSCA concept, the mission of the National US&R Response System is to 
supplement—not replace—local, regional, and state US&R teams. According to FEMA, 
the task forces deploy to “provide assistance in structural collapse rescue.”95 
While the system takes an “all hazards” approach to US&R philosophically, and 
despite the apparent waning of the nuclear terrorism threat, the National US&R Response 
System has been planning its response to an IND attack in a major city as late as 2017.96 
As shown in Figure 3, proposals for this plan call for the heavy use of military Title 32 and 
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Tile 10 forces. Specifically, Title 32 CERFPs and CBRN Task Forces would be deployed 
to the moderate damage zone, while Title 10 DCRF and C2CRE forces would collaborate 
and integrate with FEMA US&R task forces in the light damage zone.97 
 
Figure 3. National US&R Response System’s IND Concept of Operations.98  
These zones are the predicted areas of destruction following a nuclear detonation 
in a major American city, as outlined in the National Security Staff Interagency Policy 
Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness & Response to Radiological and Nuclear 
Threats’ Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation (illustrated in Figure 
4).99 The Department of Health and Human Services’ Radiation Emergency Medical 
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Management has developed guidance on these zones into a table. According to this table, 
in regards to the moderate damage zone, “Rescues here will focus on victims with urgent 
needs who are unable to self-evacuate.” It also states, “Urban search and rescue will be 
most efficient and effective in non-radiologically contaminated areas of this zone.” As for 
the light damage zone, “Most of the injuries in this zone are not expected to be life 
threatening,” and, “injuries are expected to be associated with flying glass and debris from 
the blast wave and traffic accidents.”100 
 
Figure 4. Damage Zones following an IND Detonation.101  
According to Appendix E: Search and Extraction of ATP 3-11.47/AFTTP 3–2.79: 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced 
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Response Force Package (CERFP)/Homeland Response Force (HRF) Operations, the 
CERFP and CBRN Task Force search and extraction teams are well-designed to tackle the 
US&R mission in the moderate damage zone. The publication specifies:  
The organization of the National Guard CERFP and HRF includes a search 
and extraction element. This capability is focused on the response to a 
CBRN incident and differs from traditional urban search and rescue 
capabilities such as FEMA task forces. The search and extraction element 
is designed to respond quickly with a relatively light equipment package 
and to operate at structural-collapse incidents or ordinary construction 
incidents as described in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
1670.102 
However, while confidently describing its operational US&R capabilities, the 
publication also states that these teams are not designed to work entirely independent of 
close civil authority guidance. In outlining their proficiencies, it clarifies, “When deployed, 
the search and extraction element reports through appropriate channels to the local incident 
commander and provides a unique capability to local and state response agencies.”103 As 
far as independent operations, it states, “The search and extraction element typically 
receives direction in the hot zone from local agencies, although internal reporting 
requirements and directives can be expected to remain in place.”104 
This posture contradicts the expectations described in the proposed National US&R 
Response System’s IND Response Concept of Operations. While it appears that FEMA 
expects the DOD’s search and extraction teams to perform US&R operations 
independently in the moderate damage zone, the CBRN Response Enterprise’s operational 
plan stresses that its role is simply to compliment the efforts of local civil authorities. It 
declares, “While it is important to describe capabilities under the National Incident 
Management System compliant terminology, it is fully understood and accepted that search 
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and extraction element capability was designed to augment state and local emergency 
response assets.”105 
Furthermore, the CBRN Response Enterprise’s overall response matrix does not 
align with the FEMA US&R IND Response Concept of Operations in the context of the 
Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation’s damage zone predictions. The 
medium damage zone is predicted to be the area in most need of aggressive US&R 
capabilities, but this area of responsibility has been assigned solely to the lesser operations-
trained CERFP and CBRN Task Force elements.106 After all, these elements are expected 
to be the first US&R-capable components of the enterprise to arrive. Paradoxically, the 
technician-level trained Title 10 US&R forces are dedicated to the light damage zone, 
where they will partner and collaborate with the technician-level trained teams of the 
National US&R Response System.107 
Although the operational capabilities statement of the search and extraction teams 
differentiates them from standard FEMA US&R teams based on CBRN capabilities, it also 
acknowledges their limitations.108 Only wholesomely trained to the operations-level of 
response in three US&R disciplines, the search and extraction teams are intended to be a 
force multiplication force, not a stand-alone element.109 These mismatches in operational 
intentions and real world planning reveal a misunderstanding of civil authorities’ 
expectations, and the DCSA mandate places responsibility for rectifying these 
miscommunications on the CBRN Response Enterprise. 
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c. Tactics 
Since tactics are the direct employment of resources to accomplish incident 
response objectives, it is the final tier for this analysis.110 A domestic nuclear detonation 
has never occurred to test the US&R tactics of civil US&R authorities or the CBRN 
Response Enterprise, so the best place to examine relevant response doctrine within this 
realm is training. Therefore, this section examines federal civil and military US&R training 
policy and doctrine and identifies opportunities for improvement for the CBRN Response 
Enterprise. 
Training standards for all domestic US&R operations are driven primarily by two 
consensus standards: NFPA 1006: Standard for Technical Rescue Personnel Professional 
Qualifications and NFPA 1670: Standard on Operations and Training for Technical 
Search and Rescue Incidents.111 Additionally, the 29th Volume, Code of Federal 
Regulations 1910.120(q) regulates the training standards for rescuers operating in a 
hazardous material, or contaminated, environments.112 This document is supported by 
NFPA 472: Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Incidents and NFPA 473: Standard for Competencies for EMS Personnel 
Responding to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents.113 These 
standards and regulations are the foundation for all US&R training publications, both civil 
and military. 
Still, like most DOD entities, the CBRN Response Enterprise produces its own 
unique training doctrine. While acknowledging the supportive nature and mandate behind 
its role in domestic CBRN incident response, it is a blending of military and civilian 
response principles. Published in August 2020, Training Circular Number 3–37.51: Urban 
Search and Rescue provides the training curriculum for all search and extraction and search 
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and rescue courses within in the CBRN Response Enterprise. It states, “This training 
circular helps the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise 
task force level units conducting US&R/urban search and extraction missions and below 
to prepare their training plan for the unit’s specific mission to the defense support of civil 
authorities.”114 However, it goes on to affirm adherence to underlying military doctrine 
and principles. It states: 
The US&R training circular serves as one module of the common 
operational doctrine for the defense CBRN response force and the entire 
CRE. Its central idea, adapted to the unique conditions of the homeland 
operational environment, represents the Army’s unique contribution to civil 
support. It will support our doctrine, our training, and our leader 
professional development programs.115 
This blending of doctrine leaves the CBRN Response Enterprise open to 
misconceptions about the needs of civil US&R authorities, considering the differences in 
civil rescuer and military philosophies of response. In CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at 
Major Public Events: Planning and Response, Kaszeta explores the implications of this 
conundrum for both groups. He observes, “Military CBRN defense doctrine seeks to 
provide for the minimal degradation to operations. This precept, in turn, drives the design 
and specification of equipment and the development of tactics, techniques, and 
procedures.”116 Conversely, civilian rescuers have vastly different approaches to domestic 
incident response. Kaszeta states, “In most places, the fire services operate under a much 
more rigid risk philosophy than that which prevails on military battlefields.”117 These 
differences are reflected in the way these entities tactically train and prepare. 
While development of and adherence to organizational doctrine is important for 
managing large organizations like the CBRN Response Enterprise and greater DOD, this 
pledge can be detrimental when the mission is to support other government agencies, 
particularly civil US&R authorities. As Eden discovers in Whole World on Fire, blind 
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obedience to doctrine can be harmful to a large organization’s efforts, especially when its 
basic assumptions are false.118 Therefore, to prevent misconceptions, the CBRN Response 
Enterprise needs to engage civil US&R authorities in an open dialog. To this end, it should 
inquire what training should be provided to enterprise US&R forces to make them most 
helpful to civil authorities following a domestic nuclear attack. 
2. Local US&R Response 
Local US&R response in the United States is a much more decentralized enterprise, 
as is planning and doctrine for a domestic nuclear detonation. Therefore, while the previous 
section examined federal US&R capabilities in fine detail, analyzing them in the three 
domains of incident response, this segment takes a more wholesome approach. By doing 
so, it highlights the necessity for a better understanding of the expectations of local civil 
US&R authorities after a domestic nuclear detonation by the CBRN Response Enterprise. 
As previously established, civilian government agencies hold the authority for 
domestic disaster responses in the United States.119 This rule is especially true at the state 
and local levels of government, and a nuclear detonation is no exception. However, it runs 
contrary to popular belief, as the military is often portrayed as rushing in to save the day 
during major incidents in film and popular culture.120 Concerningly, this myth persists in 
the minds of some state and local emergency mangers, planners, and responders. In a 2019 
FEMA PrepTalk, physicist and nuclear emergency researcher Brooke Buddemeier speaks 
of his experience asking state and local emergency managers what they need from the 
federal government following a nuclear detonation. Paraphrasing one of the most common 
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reactions to his question, Buddemeier quips, “Nuclear detonation? That’s a fed thing, right? 
Wait for the guys in green to save the day?”121 
While mildly sarcastic, Buddemeier’s observation highlights the decades-old 
debate over who is truly responsible for leading the response after a domestic nuclear 
detonation, the affected local and state agencies, or the federal government. Since it is 
unprecedented and would be so catastrophic, some believe that a nuclear detonation is an 
exigent circumstance warranting or requiring total federal response oversight.122 In its 
drafted 2017 IND Operations Concept, the National US&R Response System is doubtful 
an effective local response is even possible. It states, “A coordinated local response is 
unlikely in an event of this magnitude. Local infrastructure will have been severely 
impacted. The detonation will have severely impacted the overall continuity of 
operation.”123 Agreeing, Buddemeier admits, speaking of state and local authorities, 
“Nobody really has a plan for the aftermath of a nuclear detonation.”124 Reflecting on his 
observations, he marvels, “In fact, there’s a lot of uncertainty about what the response 
needs even are, and what the role of federal, state, and local agencies is.”125  
Although the myth persists locally that the federal government will assume 
command of any incident involving a nuclear attack, federal doctrine is more supportive 
than controlling, assuming that all emergencies are ultimately managed locally. According 
to the Department of Homeland Security and the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), “A basic premise of NIMS is that all incidents begin and end locally. NIMS does 
not take command away from state and local authorities.”126 This philosophy is echoed in 
DOD doctrine, with Joint Publication 3-28 declaring, “Response begins at the local level 
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with public officials and responders at the county, city, municipality, or town affected by 
the incident.”127 Furthermore, according to Publication 3–41, CBRN incidents, including 
nuclear detonations, are no special exception. It states, “Domestic CBRN response is 
managed at the lowest possible level, with DOD providing support as directed.”128 
Buddemeier goes on to underscore the importance of this supportive posture during a 
domestic nuclear detonation, warning, “The most important life-saving decisions are those 
made in the first few minutes and hours of the event. Those are not going to be coming 
from Washington, D.C.”129 
Despite this supportive attitude, military doctrine has failed to identify and address 
the specific needs of local civil authorities after a nuclear detonation, specifically in terms 
of US&R. Joint Publication 3-41 acknowledges the importance of augmenting local 
response efforts, stating: 
For CBRN response forces, the most critical operational decision in the first 
24 hours will be determination of how and where to employ life-saving 
(search and extraction, decontamination, and medical triage and emergency 
medical) capabilities. The most likely employment of forces is at the 
upwind or crosswind points either reinforcing local responders or 
establishing additional search and extraction, decontamination, and medical 
triage and emergency medical sites at upwind and crosswind points that 
local responders do not have the capability to cover.130  
While this statement outlines the importance of being responsive to the needs of local civil 
authorities during such an event, understanding these needs is not mentioned in the special 
considerations sections of Joint Publication 3-41 or any other relevant DOD doctrine.131 
One reason for this gap in understanding may be the decentralized nature of US&R 
response policy and doctrine for a domestic nuclear detonation among state and local civil 
authorities. Emergency services in the United States are a decentralized enterprise, and 
 
127 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-28, xi. 
128 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41, x. 
129 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “PrepTalks: Brooke Buddemeier “Saving Lives after a 
Nuclear Detonation.”“ 
130 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-41, II-18. 
131 Joint Chiefs of Staff, II-31—II-33. 
34 
varying levels of laws, regulations, capabilities, and coordination exist across these 
jurisdictions. According to the NFPA’s 2018 U.S. Fire Department Profile, “There were 
29,705 fire departments in the United States in 2018. Of these, 18% were all career or 
mostly career departments and protected 68% of the U.S. population.”132 This 
decentralization is reflected in state and local US&R capabilities, with different authorities 
having varying models of US&R delivery. Consequently, it is much more difficult to 
ascertain the specific US&R needs of local civil authorities. 
Another reason may be the disconnected, and occasionally strained, relationship 
between local and military response authorities, particularly in the realm of CBRN 
response. Differences in philosophy, doctrine, and mission exist between civil and military 
responders that can create gaps in communication and understanding when the two entities 
operate together, and these differences can devolve into animosity. As Kaszeta points out 
in CBRN Incidents at Major Public Events: Planning and Response, “A lot of mistrust was 
sown in the late 1990s when the U.S. Army attempted to lecture local emergency 
responders on the CBRN threat. In reality, it had a lot that it needed to learn from the civil-
sector responders.”133 The strain in this relationship is compounded by unfavorable 
cultural views of DOD support among local authorities. Kaszeta also observes, “In many 
places, military support is considered a last resort or a heavy-handed tool to be called in 
when things get bad. This often means that military planners are left out of the planning 
stages for major events because the arrival of military support is, in some people’s minds, 
an admission of failure.”134 
Regardless, it is the mandate of the DOD to prepare the CBRN Response Enterprise 
better to support local US&R authorities following a domestic nuclear attack, and 
accomplishing this mission requires a better understanding of their needs. The search and 
extraction and search and rescue elements of the enterprise are doctrinally designed to 
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augment and integrate with local US&R units, as illustrated in enterprise doctrine. 
Specifically, the Search and Extraction Appendix of ATP 3-11.47/AFTTP 3–2.79: 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced 
Response Force Package (CERFP)/Homeland Response Force (HRF) Operations states, 
“It is feasible that extraction personnel work hand in hand with local authorities; 
firefighters; hazmat teams; and other local, state, and federal agencies.”135 According to 
Buddemeier, failing to address these issues could lead to “an apathy in planning that could 
get hundreds of thousands of people killed or injured.”136 
E. CONCLUSION 
The DSCA mission allows the DOD to support civil authorities following domestic 
nuclear detonations, which is accomplished through the CBRN Response Enterprise. 
Particularly in the realm of US&R, the enterprise employs its Title 32 search and extraction 
teams and Title 10 search and rescue elements to augment the life-saving efforts of both 
federal and local civil agencies during such events. As with any other emergency, this aid 
is delivered at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of incident response. 
However, gaps exist between military and civilian US&R planning, policy, and 
doctrine in all three domains, and they manifest at both the federal and local levels of 
government. These holes are indicative of a lack of understanding of the expectations of 
civil US&R authorities following a domestic nuclear attack on the part of the DOD. 
Allowed to persist, they could render a real-world response unorganized and ineffective.  
Since it is the DOD’s duty to support civil authority-led rescue efforts during such 
an event, investigating the intentions of local and federal civil responders for the 
employment of DOD US&R capabilities could offer insights that would bridge these gaps 
in understanding. Further, it could empower the DOD to prepare for its supportive role 
better. Therefore, the following chapter details the research interviews conducted to 
achieve these ends. 
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE EXPECTATIONS OF CIVIL URBAN 
SEARCH AND RESCUE AUTHORITIES AFTER A DOMESTIC 
NUCLEAR DETONATION 
The fact of the matter is that we cannot function without admitting the limits 
of our knowledge and trusting in the expertise of others. 
—Tom Nichols 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the context of US&R, the previous chapter analyzed the layers of systems and 
authorities for responding to a domestic nuclear detonation. It identified gaps and holes in 
the overarching response architecture, most notably the DOD’s lack of understanding of 
the needs and expectations of civil US&R authorities during such an incident. This gap is 
particularly concerning, considering CBRN incident response falls under the silo of 
DSCA.137 
While the DOD’s role in domestic response is primarily supportive, the 
development and organization of the CBRN Response Enterprise has largely occurred 
without the direct input of federal or local civil authorities, particularly in the realm of 
US&R. Consequently, the enterprise’s US&R doctrine is largely based in assumption. 
Challenging these assumptions, research interviews were conducted to understand the 
expectations of civil US&R authorities better after a domestic nuclear detonation. From 
these interviews, recommendations for improving CBRN Response Enterprise US&R 
doctrine were ascertained. 
This chapter describes the research interviews, as well as their findings. It begins 
with a description of their design and structure, followed by a report on their outcomes. 
Then, it concludes with a comparative analysis between the two groups interviewed. By 
following this systematic flow, the reader will understand how the US&R elements of the 
CBRN Response Enterprise can accomplish the DSCA mission better following a domestic 
nuclear detonation. 
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B. RESEARCH INTERVIEWS’ DESIGN AND STRUCTURE 
As previously established, the CBRN Response Enterprise supports the lifesaving 
US&R efforts of civil authorities after a domestic nuclear detonation.138 These authorities 
fall within two categories, federal and local. Comparatively, these groups are different, 
with unique missions, authorities, cultures, structures, and capabilities. Specifically, in 
regards to nuclear detonation response, they have diverging degrees of awareness, 
planning, and expectations. Therefore, respondents from both groups were interviewed. 
Given the high propensity for damage and casualties, major cities are among the 
most vulnerable targets to a nuclear attack.139 Thus, local civil authority interviewees were 
selected from three metropolitan statistical areas, as defined by the United States Census 
Bureau. While the implications of the study are thus limited, as suburban and rural 
jurisdictions may have vastly different perspectives, capabilities, and needs, it ensured the 
results are relevant to some of America’s most susceptible targets. Further, interviewees in 
this group were special operations coordinators for fire departments charged with US&R 
responsibilities in these jurisdictions. This requirement ensured the interviewees had direct 
knowledge of the tactical, operational, and strategic realms of their agency’s US&R plans, 
policies, and response doctrine. 
Since FEMA is designated to lead the federal US&R response to any such event, 
FEMA’s National US&R Response System leaders comprised the second group of 
interviewees.140 While the system has an oversight office in FEMA headquarters, from 
which interviewees could have been selected for questions on strategy and policy, the 
information sought by this study was just as much tactical and operational as it was 
strategic.141 Therefore, the FEMA US&R representatives selected for interview held the 
rank task force leader or program manager. In the event of a nuclear detonation, these 
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leaders would have direct responsibility for coordinating tactically and operationally with 
CBRN Response Enterprise US&R assets, while considering the strategic aims of the 
response efforts. 
According to the World Population Review, as of 2020, 66 American cities have a 
population of over 300,000 people, and 200 cities have a population of over 142,000.142 
Most of these cities have their own local fire departments with varying degrees of US&R 
capabilities and degrees of planning and preparation, in addition to the resources provided 
by the 50 state governments, plus Washington, DC. In comparison, only 28 US&R teams 
are spread throughout the United States in the FEMA National US&R Response System, 
but they have a higher degree of tactical, operational, and strategic continuity between 
them.143 Therefore, an even spread between local and federal interviewees was deemed 
appropriate, with three selected from local fire departments and three from the FEMA 
National US&R System. 
Interviews were conducted in person, when possible, and over the phone. With 
permission, all were recorded and transcribed. While academic, investigative, and orderly, 
all were conducted as a conversation, with interviewees encouraged to explore potential 
problems and gaps within the context of their agency’s policies and doctrine. It should be 
noted that a Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that 
the content of the interviews did not constitute human subjects research, so associated IRB 
control measures were not deemed necessary. 
Thirteen questions were asked in sequential order, with follow-up questions and 
requests for expounding interjected as the natural flow of the interview allowed, including: 
How often do your urban search and rescue units conduct training for structural collapse 
events? What are your organization’s expectations of CBRN Response Enterprise urban 
search and rescue personnel during a nuclear detonation response? How will your 
organization employ CBRN Response Enterprise urban search and rescue personnel to 
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augment life-saving urban search and rescue efforts during a nuclear detonation response? 
What kind of training has your organization found would best prepare CBRN Response 
Enterprise urban search and rescue personnel to support life-saving urban search and rescue 
efforts during a nuclear detonation response? The Appendix has a complete list of the 
questions. 
Since many civil authorities have not collaborated with the military during a major 
response, it was not assumed that the interviewees were entirely familiar with the CBRN 
Response Enterprise’s US&R capabilities. To prevent them from having to speak blindly, 
they were provided a standard outline describing the enterprise, its response matrix, and its 
US&R capabilities before the interview. This outline empowered the respondents to 
provide informed, thoughtful, and calculated answers to the questions. It also allowed them 
to deeply consider the limitations and potential gaps in an interagency response to a 
domestic nuclear detonation within the context of their agency policies, response plans, 
doctrine, and capabilities. 
Within the context of the study, a significant question that could be asked is the 
type and yield of nuclear detonation being investigated. Unlike conventional bombs, 
nuclear weapons can have yields from the kiloton to the megaton range.144 Further, they 
can be detonated in the air over a target, as is often the case with missiles and strategic 
weapons, or near the surface of the earth, as may more likely be the case with an IND or 
terrorist weapon.145 
While any nuclear detonation would presumably be a catastrophic event that would 
challenge the US&R response capabilities of civil responders, variations in these factors 
could potentially change the resulting patterns of damage, injury, and overall severity of 
the event.146 Therefore, it would be fair to ask what particular type of nuclear detonation, 
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strategic or IND, and what yield is examined in this study. After all, US&R needs in a post-
blast environment are largely dependent upon these factors. 
Although the original focus of the CBRN Response Enterprise was a 10 kiloton, 
surface-blast IND detonation as an act of terrorism, great power competition has renewed 
concerns about strategic nuclear weapons, which gives the results of this study a wider 
range of applicability.147 Therefore, whenever possible, respondents were encouraged to 
consider a range of events, and relevant evidence was analyzed in such fashion. However, 
whenever analysis required a more specific event, a 10 kiloton, surface-blast IND was the 
assumed event. As explored in the previous chapter, such an event is still the foundation 
behind most nuclear detonation response planning and doctrine. 
C. INTERVIEWS OF FEDERAL CIVIL US&R AUTHORITIES 
As previously stated, one task force leader and two program managers from the 
National US&R Response System were interviewed as representatives of the federal civil 
US&R authority category. Their names and agency affiliations are as follows: 
• Jeff Sanders, Director, Texas Task Force 1 (TXTF-1) 
• Thomas (Tom) Neal, Program Manager, Indiana Task Force 1 (INTF-1) 
• Mike Kenny, Task Force Leader, New York Task Force 1 (NYTF-1) 
Naturally, some common themes emerged from the insights provided by the 
respondents. These themes were consistent with gaps and holes these professionals’ 
agencies have encountered over years of planning and coordinating US&R responses and 
trainings, particularly in partnership with the military. 
Unlike their local civil authority counterparts (which are discussed in the following 
section), these US&R professionals were all well versed in the capabilities of the CBRN 
Response Enterprise. The FEMA US&R System has conducted extensive training with the 
enterprise’s US&R elements, particularly at the Title 32 level. According to the interview 
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with Neal, annual exercises are included, such as the United Front Exercise between INTF-
1 and Indiana’s CERFP. Further, based on the interviews with Sanders and Neal, many 
teams in the system have partnered with the National Guard during several real-world 
incidents, such as the federal response to Hurricane Florence. 
Across the domains of incident response, the concept of force multiplication was 
cited by all three interviewees when asked how the CBRN Response Enterprise could best 
deploy and integrate with their US&R units following a domestic nuclear detonation. 
Specifically, Kenny of NYTF-1 recommended the direct integration of operations level-
trained military US&R personnel into FEMA US&R rescue squads to create “super 
squads.” According to the interview with Kenny, this concept involves allowing the more 
experienced rescuers of the FEMA US&R Response System to provide direct operational 
and tactic level guidance and leadership to lesser experienced CBRN Response Enterprise 
personnel. 
Keeping with this theme, according to all three interviewees, the respondents also 
noted the importance of manpower to US&R in post-nuclear detonation environments. As 
Neal of INTF-1 pointed out, a significant challenge is keeping rescuers’ exposure to 
radiation low, as it requires frequent cycling of teams operating in contaminated areas. 
Sanders of TXTF-1 echoed this observation, also noting the added challenge of heat stress 
to responders working for long periods in PPE. From their agencies’ perspectives, the large 
number of troops the CBRN Response Enterprise can deploy during such an event is 
invaluable. 
Still, all three respondents felt operations-level training is both sufficient and ideal 
for enterprise US&R elements. The National US&R Response System is comprised of 
experienced professional rescuers considered subject matter experts in various fields of 
emergency response.148 Furthermore, all three noted that their task forces dedicated 
countless hours to US&R relevant training annually. Conversely, as Kenny pointed out, 
US&R is collateral duty for many soldiers and airmen of the CBRN Response Enterprise. 
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Consequently, they are less experienced, and they would benefit from direct oversight by 
FEMA personnel. 
Despite their limited experience, the interviewees maintained that CBRN Response 
Enterprise Response US&R elements would be welcome in their agencies’ response plans 
for domestic nuclear detonations. Sanders emphasized their potential role in wide area 
search, which is the process of “systematic searches over a large affected area” to locate 
the victims of a disaster.149 According to Sanders, this activity is labor intensive, requiring 
large numbers of personnel, but less technical in nature. Kenny added that tool-familiarity 
training would also be beneficial, as enterprise US&R personnel would make excellent 
runners and support staff for active task force rescue squads. 
D. INTERVIEWS OF LOCAL CIVIL US&R AUTHORITIES 
Following the interviewees from the National US&R Response System, three 
representatives from the local level of emergency response were interviewed. All three 
were career firefighters from major metropolitan areas with authority for US&R response 
within their jurisdictions, and each was responsible for the planning and execution of 
domestic nuclear detonation-related US&R response policy and doctrine within their 
organizations. Furthermore, all three were highly experienced in the field of US&R. 
Although accessibility to the author influenced their specific selection, and they were a 
small sample, they represented the mean state of knowledge among local officials serving 
in similar capacities. Their names and agency affiliations are as follows: 
• Kevin Jones, Division Chief of Special Operations, Indianapolis Fire 
Department 
• Jacob (Jake) Hoffman, Private, Special Operations Bureau, Toledo Fire & 
Rescue Department 
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• Craig Cooper, Battalion Chief of Special Operations, Las Vegas Fire & 
Rescue 
Compared to those of the federal civil authority classification, some very different 
themes emerged from the responses of this group. Most notably, all three respondents 
admitted that their agencies had given very little thought to their US&R needs following a 
domestic nuclear detonation. In fact, their agencies had few formal plans for such a 
response at all. Consequently, they had virtually no official plans, policy, or doctrine for 
partnering or integrating with the CBRN Response Enterprise to achieve response 
objectives following a domestic nuclear detonation. 
Furthermore, none of the respondents was intimately familiar with the US&R 
response capabilities of the CBRN Response Enterprise prior to the interview. Two of them 
spoke at length about the highly visible WMD-CSTs; Cooper stated he has worked with 
these teams extensively during special events, as did Hoffman. However, beyond these 
teams, their knowledge of the grander enterprise was extremely limited. Both were vaguely 
familiar with the US&R elements of the CBRN Response Enterprise’s Title 32 forces, but 
none of the interviewees had knowledge of the Title 10 DCRF or C2CREs. Put simply, the 
respondents knew very little about the US&R capabilities of the CBRN Response 
Enterprise. 
Consequently, all three respondents struggled to answer questions about how the 
CBRN Response Enterprise’s US&R elements fit into their post-nuclear detonation plans. 
This was just as much due to a lack of overall nuclear detonation response planning as it 
was unfamiliarity with the enterprise. While all three did their best to answer the questions 
from the standpoints of their agencies’ policies and procedures, they conceded that the 
interviews had exposed a major gap in their major incident planning and preparedness. 
Still, some important insights were discovered during these interviews, particularly 
in regards to US&R skill exposure. Most notably, these respondents’ agencies conduct 
hours of US&R continuing education annually. While this training is not necessarily 
conducted within the context of a domestic nuclear detonation, as it is within the CBRN 
Response Enterprise, it is vastly more frequent. Furthermore, these agencies benefit from 
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the repetition of frequent real-world US&R responses. It is also worth noting they do not 
frequently train on wide area search techniques, which reveals a potential gap. 
Additionally, in the event of a domestic nuclear detonation, the respondents stated 
their agencies would rely heavily on the DOD for technical expertise. In the absence of 
exhaustive planning, Jones expressed a need for military help across all domains incident 
response. Similarly, Cooper articulated an intent to capitalize on the DOD’s community of 
collective knowledge. 
However, to make the most of military support during such an event, Cooper also 
spoke of the importance of pre-emptive relationship-building. Such efforts build trust, 
which has been vital to interagency cooperation during past major incidents in his 
jurisdiction. In the case of the CBRN Response Enterprise and its US&R capabilities, his 
agency expects a domestic nuclear detonation would be no different. 
E. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
When examined comparatively, a dichotomy emerges between the expectations of 
federal and local civil US&R authorities after a domestic nuclear detonation in the context 
of military support. As the interviews demonstrated, these two groups have very different 
takes on both DOD US&R support and the greater domestic nuclear detonation threat. 
Consequently, they answered the research questions quite differently, and these responses 
can be compared and contrasted. 
Overall, the National US&R Response System has given much thought to the 
domestic nuclear attack threat, and it is well versed in the military’s supportive capabilities. 
As a result, the task force leader and program managers interviewed were able to articulate 
their expectations of the CBRN Response Enterprise’s US&R elements clearly and 
concisely. Specifically, they expect the enterprise to adopt a more supportive role under 
their guidance. 
Conversely, local authorities do not dedicate as many planning and preparedness 
resources to such a lofty threat. Furthermore, they receive much less exposure to the 
46 
enterprise’s US&R forces, so they are far less familiar with their capabilities. As a result, 
their needs are more general and ambiguous. 
Despite these differences, common themes exist between these two groups. Most 
notably, both local and federal civil authorities are much more thoroughly trained and 
experienced in US&R than CBRN Response Enterprise forces. Regardless, both recognize 
the vitality of military support following a domestic nuclear detonation, and they view the 
DOD and the enterprise as partners in response. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Since the DOD’s role after a domestic nuclear detonation is supportive of civil 
US&R authorities, it is important to understand their expectations. This must occur at both 
the federal and local levels of response, as their perspectives and needs are vastly different. 
To achieve this end, research interviews were conducted with representatives of both 
groups. These interviews demonstrated the need for better civil-military US&R 
synchronization on the part of the enterprise, particularly on matters of response structure, 
training, and outreach. Also, it revealed a topic worthy of further investigation: the 
challenges presented to US&R efforts by post-nuclear detonation environments. Moving 
forward, the next chapter will describe how the CBRN Response Enterprise can overcome 
these challenges to meet the expectations of civil US&R authorities. 
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IV. CHALLENGES PRESENTED TO URBAN SEARCH AND 
RESCUE SUPPORT BY POST-NUCLEAR DETONATION 
ENVIRONMENTS 
Survival is adaptation, and adaptation is change, but it is change based on a 
true reading of the environment. 
—Laurence Gonzales 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Given the persistent gaps in understanding between the CBRN Response 
Enterprise and civil US&R authorities, the previous chapter of this thesis detailed 
research interviews that were conducted to begin bridging this divide. These interviews 
indicated that one significant challenge to achieving this end is the post-nuclear 
detonation environment. For example, according to Sanders and Neal, when conducting 
US&R in such an environment, the hazards presented by radiation exposure and heat 
stress require large numbers of personnel to accomplish the mission successfully, and 
the resulting additional layers of complexity challenge the skills of even best trained and 
most experienced rescuers. These factors call into question the efficacy of the 
enterprise’s current response model, which makes them worthy of further investigation. 
However, this research is not the first publication to identify the fact that added 
challenges are presented to US&R operations by CBRN environments, nor is it the first 
to question the CBRN Response Enterprise’s ability to face these obstacles in delivering 
US&R support to civil authorities. In CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public 
Events: Planning and Response, Kaszeta states, “there are some situations where USAR 
may be necessary in contaminated environments.”150 Under a picture of two enterprise 
rescuers working in PPE, he adds, “Structural collapse in a contaminated environment 
adds a layer of complexity to rescue operations.”151  
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In this same piece, he also gives a brief overview of these issues as they relate to 
the National Guard’s CERFPs. He states, “In several cases, CERPs seem to be taking 
the Urban Search and Rescue mission seriously in CBRN environments, which is a 
useful development.” However, he concludes, “Just how well the CST and CERFP will 
perform in a large-scale CBRN incident is a matter of conjecture, but is seems to me that 
their presence is far better than their absence.”152 
While Kaszeta was instrumental in establishing one of the early, hazardous 
materials response-centric WMD-CSTs, the search and extraction concept of the 
CERFPs was still in its infancy when his book was published in 2013.153 Only 12 such 
teams were in existence, but today they number 17, plus 10 more embedded within the 
CBRN Task Forces of the HRFs.154 However, even with the passing of time, Kaszeta’s 
question of efficacy remains largely unanswered. As of 2018, the CBRN Response 
Enterprise has still never deployed to a domestic nuclear detonation or any other major 
CBRN incident.155 
Therefore, this chapter builds upon the previous chapter’s findings by examining 
the challenges presented to CBRN Response Enterprise US&R efforts by post-nuclear 
detonation environments. Furthermore, it investigates how the enterprise can overcome 
these challenges to accomplish its DSCA mission. By doing so, it attempts to identify 
additional ways the DOD can maximize the employment of CBRN Response Enterprise 
US&R capabilities to support civil authority–directed lifesaving operations following a 
domestic nuclear detonation. 
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B. HAZARDS PRESENTED TO RESCUERS BY POST-NUCLEAR 
DETONATION ENVIRONMENTS 
Upon detonation, a nuclear weapon causes a variety of effects, including blast 
pressure, thermal radiation, ionizing radiation, optical effects, and electromagnetic 
pulses.156 These effects can be classified as either prompt or delayed, depending upon 
when they occur in relationship to the detonation. Certain effects—such as ionizing 
radiation—exist in both categories. As explained in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident 
Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans: 
Nuclear detonations produce ‘prompt’ effects that radiate outward from 
the detonation location and ‘delayed’ effects. Prompt effects usually 
occur within the first minute after a detonation and include an intense 
flash of light, blast shockwave, extreme heat, prompt radiation, and 
Source Region Electromagnetic Pulse. The delayed effects are primarily 
the neutron-activated debris around the detonation site and the 
atmospherically dispersed radioactive fallout.157  
Figure 5 provides an approximated timeline for the presentation and duration of these 
effects and their associated hazards following a 10-kiloton IND detonation, and Figure 
6 illustrates their distributive impact. 
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Figure 5. Expected Timeline of Events for a 10-kiloton Improvised Nuclear 
Device Detonation.158  
Since they would arrive to the scene well after the detonation, of most concern to 
US&R responders is the delayed effects and their associated hazards. As seen in Figure 5, 
these hazards can be defined as secondary structural collapse, radiation, and fire. In this 
order, the following section examines each of these hazards through the lens of US&R 
response. 
 
Figure 6. Approximate Distribution of Nuclear Weapons Effects.159  
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1. Secondary Structural Collapse 
As previously established, the prompt effect of blast pressure is what causes 
buildings to collapse and entrap victims, which then requires a US&R response.160 In the 
immediate hours after the detonation, the threat of additional and progressive collapse in 
structurally compromised buildings is also possible, called secondary collapse.161 
However, this collapse is a standard, anticipated hazard in any structural collapse 
emergency, and it is normally be mitigated by standard US&R practices, primarily 
shoring.162 
2. Nuclear Fallout 
The effect of ionizing radiation makes US&R efforts in post-nuclear detonation 
environments unique. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
“Ionizing radiation is a form of energy that acts by removing electrons from atoms and 
molecules of materials that include air, water, and living tissue. Ionizing radiation can 
travel unseen and pass through these materials.”163 This ability to affect living tissue 
makes ionizing radiation hazardous. At certain dosages, it can cause serious acute and 
delayed health effects.164 
Again, since they would arrive to the scene after the prompt effects have occurred, 
ionizing radiation’s delayed effects and associated hazard of radioactive fallout are most 
precarious to US&R responders. Lingering long after the initial event, this residual 
radiation is found both deposited around the blast site—called groundshine—and 
suspended in the air, which makes it environmental and atmospheric in nature. While 
 
160 Department of Homeland Security, Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the Response and 
Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans, Branch 1-Page 27. 
161 Norman, Fire Department Special Operations, 282. 
162 Norman, 301. 
163 “The Electromagnetic Spectrum: Ionizing Radiation,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
December 7, 2015, https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/radiation/
ionizing_radiation.html#:~:text=Ionizing%20radiation%20is%20a%20form%20of%20energy%20that%20a
cts%20by,and%20pass%20through%20these%20materials. 
164 “Radiation Exposure: Diagnose and Manage Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS),” U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services Radiation Emergency Medical Management, December 16, 2020, 
https://www.remm.nlm.gov/exposureonly.htm#skip. 
52 
airborne fallout can be spread by wind, groundshine is initially more hazardous.165 Figure 
7 illustrates the standard predictive model of effects and hazards for a 10 kiloton, surface 
blast nuclear detonation, including prompt radiation and fallout. 
 
Figure 7. Patterns of Effects and Hazards for a 10 Kiloton, Surface Blast 
Nuclear Detonation.166 
To ensure the health, safety, and effectiveness of US&R responders, they must be 
protected from fallout exposure and contamination. According to the Department of Health 
and Human Services’ Radiation Emergency Medical Management webpage, “Radiation 
exposure occurs when all or part of the body absorbs penetrating ionizing radiation from 
an external radiation source.”167 Conversely, “Contamination results when a radioisotope 
(as gas, liquid, or solid) is released into the environment and then ingested, inhaled, or 
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deposited on the body surface.”168 Therefore, the time responders spend in radiation fields 
must be limited, and PPE must be used to prevent radioactive material from contacting and 
remaining on their bodies. 
Radiation exposure in humans is measured as a dose, and the primary tool for 
minimizing an emergency responder’s dose is the principle of as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA).169 As illustrated in Figure 8, ALARA calls for minimizing time 
around, maximizing distance from, and using barriers as shielding against sources of 
radioactivity.170 Additionally, CBRN incident response agencies should set total dose 
limits for emergency operations. As an example, the Environment Protection Agency 
recommends responders not be permitted to receive more than a 25 roentgen equivalent 
man once-in-a-lifetime dose in lifesaving operations, except on a voluntary basis.171 
However, the National US&R Response System has set a single deployment radiation dose 
limit of 50 roentgen equivalent man.172 
As previously stated, US&R responders must be protected from fallout 
contamination, and it must be done with consideration for the routes of exposure: 
inhalation, absorption, ingestion, direct contact, and injection.173 In a post-nuclear 
detonation environment, it is achieved using PPE. Respirators, eye protection, over 
garments, gloves, and boots are generally sufficient for a radiation field.174 However, since 
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collapsed buildings typically present with sharp steel and other injection hazards, US&R 
work in such an environment calls for more robust, penetration resistant PPE.175 
 
Figure 8. Time, Distance, and Shielding.176  
3. Fire 
A second, and often less emphasized, hazard to US&R responders following a 
nuclear detonation is fire. As is the case with ionizing radiation-related hazards, fire is the 
result of both prompt and delayed effects.177 In Whole World on Fire, Eden describes how 
the prompt effects of blast pressure and thermal radiation—called nuclear flash—result in 
fires following a hypothetical 300 kiloton, near-surface blast nuclear detonation near the 
Pentagon in Arlington, VA.178 She says: 
At this [3.5 miles] and greater ranges from the detonation, fire ignitions 
would result from the tremendous release of thermal energy, which would 
deposit radiant light and heat on exposed surfaces, causing the simultaneous 
combustion of many surfaces and structures. Ignitions would also be caused 
by the breakup of structures from the blast wave and accompanying winds. 
Structural breakup would cause fires by releasing flammable materials 
(such as gas, chemicals, and other hazards as gas lines and industrial 
processes were disrupted), by exposing and shorting electrical lines and 
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equipment, and by exposing additional ignitable surfaces. Such fires are 
called “blast disruption” fires.179 
However, these types of fires are not necessarily uncommon to routine structural 
collapse incidents. In fact, structural collapse is a common occurrence secondary to large 
fires in buildings, as is believed to have been the case at the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001.180 Even in the absence of fire as the impetus, disruptions to utilities 
and stored hazardous materials create serious fire hazards in most instances of building 
collapse.181 In Fire Department Special Operations, Retired Deputy Assistant Chief John 
Norman of the Fire Department of the City of New York discusses the routine threat of fire 
in relationship to additional collapse hazards at structural collapse incidents. He warns, 
“While secondary collapse is a major threat, it is not the only danger we face at these 
events. Fire and explosion are serious threats at any collapse scene, due to the likelihood 
of ruptured gas and electric lines within the remains of the structure, as well as any 
occupancy hazards that may be present, such as storage of gasoline, propane cylinders, or 
other flammables.”182 
Like nuclear fallout, the phenomenon of mass fire is unique to post-nuclear 
detonation environments. In Whole World on Fire, Eden goes on to describe how delayed 
atmospheric effects can subsequently result in mass fires following a nuclear detonation. 
She states: 
Within tens of minutes after the cataclysmic events associated with the 
detonation, a mass of buoyantly rising fire-heated air would signal the start 
of a second and distinctly different event – the development of a mass fire 
of gigantic scale and ferocity. This fire would quickly increase in intensity. 
In a fraction of an hour it would generate ground winds of hurricane force 
with average air temperatures well above the boiling point of water (212°F, 
100°C). This would produce a lethal environment over a vast contiguous 
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area. The character of mass fire results from the simultaneous combustion 
of a large area containing a fuel load typical of a city or suburb.183 
It should be noted that scientists and scholars, especially in comparison to blast 
effects, have passionately debated the occurrence and extent of a mass fire event following 
a nuclear detonation.184 As the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the Response and 
Recover Federal Interagency Operations Plans states, “The likeliness of a firestorm is 
unknown in an urban environment; some theories suggest modern construction and designs 
may buffer the fire’s ability to grow uncontrollably.”185 Indeed, like any other effect, 
thermal effects are largely dependent upon a variety of factors. These factors include height 
of the detonation in relationship to the surface of the earth, energy of the weapon in 
question, and shielding.186 Regardless, Eden found that “the uncertainty in the range of 
damage associated with mass fire can be estimated and modeled, and is not greater than 
the uncertainty associated with blast damage.”187 Further, she concluded, “For nuclear 
weapons of approximately 100 kilotons or more, the range of devastation from mass fire 
will generally be substantially greater than from blast.”188 
Regardless of the impetus, fire effects and their associated hazards must be 
addressed for US&R efforts to be successful in post-nuclear detonation environments. 
Even in the absence of a mass fire event, fires secondary to the prompt effects of thermal 
radiation and blast disruption will burn long after the detonation.189 As the Planning 
Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation warns, these fires “pose a direct threat to 
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survivors and responders.”190 This threat is especially true for those trapped and operating 
in collapsed buildings. As Norman points out in Fire Department Special Operations, both 
rescuer and victim safety and survival depends upon the mitigation of such fires. He states, 
“At fires that result from explosions or collapses, it is critical to conduct fire suppression 
efforts simultaneously with rescue efforts.”191 
As Figure 9 illustrates, the previously listed hazards of secondary collapse, nuclear 
fallout, and fire must be addressed in concert for US&R lifesaving efforts to be successful 
after a domestic nuclear detonation. Each presents a life safety threat to both victims and 
responders that requires appropriate consideration and mitigation. Accordingly, the next 
segment of this thesis examines the implications of this unique overlapping of hazards for 
US&R in post-nuclear detonation environments, particularly on the matter of radiological 
contamination. 
 
Figure 9. Hazards Presented to US&R by Post-nuclear Detonation 
Environments. 
 
190 National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness & 
Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats, Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, 
24. 
191 Norman, Fire Department Special Operations, 300. 
58 
C. URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE IN RADIOLOGICALLY 
CONTAMINATED ENVIRONMENTS 
Analyzed independently, US&R is a task-heavy discipline. Mastery requires 
proficiency in a wide range of rescue skillsets, including rope, confined space, trench, 
vehicle, machinery, and structural collapse rescue, each of which requires extensive 
training.192 As demonstrated by the research interviews with Cooper, Kenny, and Sanders 
in Chapter III, professional firefighters and rescuers spend years attending courses to obtain 
these qualifications, and proficiency and expertise is built through years of responses to 
real US&R incidents. 
As the discipline of CBRN response is also task-heavy and complex, the threat of 
radiation from nuclear fallout adds additional layers of complexity to US&R in post-
nuclear detonation environments. In CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public Events: 
Planning and Response, Kaszeta addresses these additional layers of complexity in the 
general context of radiologically contaminated environments. Towards the end of this 
work, he presents case studies of “practical scenarios” related to CBRN incident responses 
and identifies common problems and potential solutions. Scenario M, titled The “Dirty 
Bomb” and Structural Collapse, describes a hypothetical terrorist attack on a large meeting 
of global financial and political leaders with a radiological dispersal device (RDD). As 
Kaszeta describes it, “This scenario addresses two potentially overlapping situations, the 
radiological-dispersal device (RDD)—the so-called ‘dirty bomb’—and the possibility of 
structural collapse, requiring sophisticated urban search and rescue (USAR) methods.”193 
While this scenario presents the hazard of radiation exposure and contamination, it 
should be noted that an RDD attack is vastly different from a domestic nuclear detonation 
in both physics and magnitude. An RDD is a conventional explosive device that simply 
spreads a radioactive contaminant upon its detonation, which makes it much smaller in 
force and effect than a nuclear weapon.194 Further, while conventional explosions do have 
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thermal effects, they are usually not nearly as serious or self-perpetuating as nuclear 
detonations.195 
Still, Kaszeta’s case study highlights the additional challenges presented to US&R 
efforts by radiologically contaminated environments. He observes:  
Structural collapse after a terrorist bombing adds USAR issues to the 
already complicated issues of postblast investigations and CBRN 
contamination. While most USAR efforts acknowledge that hazardous 
materials of various descriptions may be present in structural-collapse 
scenarios, not many organizations have taken on the task of both USAR and 
CBRN concurrently.196  
He concludes, “Structural Collapse in a contaminated environment adds a layer of 
complexity to rescue operations.”197 This layer of complexity is the result of additional 
considerations that must be accounted for during such a response, including work/rest 
cycles, diminished dexterity and vision, and stay times. 
1. Work/Rest Cycles 
On the matter of simple rescues in CBRN environments, Kaszeta points out, 
“Rescue is only made complicated in the presence of contamination or of a percutaneous 
hazard, thus forming an acute hazard to unprotected responders.”198 Nuclear fallout is such 
a contaminant, which requires the use of CBRN PPE.199 However, using PPE during 
periods of high work volume or high stress situations can induce heat stress on responders 
that requires frequent rest periods and worker rotations.200 Planning for these work cycles 
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becomes exponentially complex when the factors of PPE donning and doffing time and 
decontamination are considered.201 
2. Diminished Dexterity and Vision 
Additionally, PPE reduces responders’ dexterity and limits their fields of vision.202 
This reduction is concerning when performing a task-heavy discipline like US&R, which 
requires fine motor skills and a high degree of situational awareness. According to Norman 
in Fire Department Special Operations: 
Technical rescue signifies the involvement of a more complex operational 
environment that often requires specialized tools or equipment as well as a 
higher degree of know-how to achieve a successful outcome. Another term 
that has come to signify the tasks involved is Urban Search and Rescue or 
USAR. The urban environment is where most (but not all, by far) of the 
more complex accidents occur.203  
In the National Park Service Technical Rescue Handbook, Ken Phillips agrees by stating 
that technical rescue work is a very dangerous activity.204 Mistakes can be fatal, and most 
are the result of human error.205 
3. Stay Times 
The final consideration is stay times in radiation fields, which was alluded to in the 
previous section. According to FEMA, “Stay time is the amount of time a responder is 
allowed to operate in a radiation field before a predefined dose limit is reached.”206 Above 
certain doses, radiation exposure can result in acute radiation syndrome, an increased 
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propensity to contract cancer in the future, or death.207 Therefore, dose limits must be 
established for US&R responders. By dividing this dose limit by a given dose rate, stay 
times can be calculated, as shown in Figure 10.208 
 
Figure 10. Calculating Stay Time.209  
Stay times provide timeframes that prevent overexposure of workers operating in 
radiation fields, as would be the case for US&R in a post-nuclear detonation 
environment.210 As FEMA explains, “By knowing this ‘stay time’ time based on the 
predefined dose, responders can make a knowledgeable decision about their own safety 
from radiation, and they can perform their response tasks. In hazardous materials response 
terminology, this is referred to as ‘work mission duration.’”211 Based upon these stay 
times, US&R responders should be rotated out of the radiation field and relieved by fresh 
forces in a post-nuclear detonation environment, as failing to do so could jeopardize their 
safety and operational effectiveness. As Kaszeta explains, “If you do not monitor the 
accumulated dose of your responders, you may ruin them for future work incidents. 
Monitor the dose closely and rotate teams to make sure people do not reach their exposure 
limits.”212 
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D. ANALYSIS OF THE CBRN RESPONSE ENTERPRISE 
Given the hazards that must be addressed for lifesaving efforts to be effective in a 
post-nuclear detonation environment, the added complexities of relevant mitigation tactics, 
and the expectations of civil US&R authorities, it is appropriate to use the previous sections 
as a lens for evaluating the CBRN Response Enterprise. More specifically, it can be used 
to analyze the enterprise’s ability to face the relevant challenges and support the lifesaving 
efforts of civil US&R authorities. Similar to the approach of Chapter II, this examination 
can occur at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of incident response. 
1. Strategy 
Since the US&R doctrine of the CBRN response enterprise is oriented specifically 
towards supporting the lifesaving efforts of civil authorities after a nuclear detonation, it is 
strategically well prepared to address the hazards posed to US&R efforts by post-nuclear 
detonation environments.213 Granted, this approach is vastly different from that of civil 
authorities, who generally take a “multi-hazard” or “all hazards” approach to US&R.214 
This approach is reflected in Annex B Concept of Operations: US&R Operations in a 
Contaminated Environment (US&R Hazmat Operations) of the National US&R System 
Response Manual, a component of the National Response Framework’s Emergency 
Support Function 9. It declares, “Consistent with FEMA’s ‘All Hazards’ approach, and as 
an integral part of the response to incidents caused by man or nature, US&R teams are 
expected to be equipped, trained, and prepared to operate in a contaminated 
environment.”215 While this statement affirms that the National US&R Response System’s 
preparedness to handle a myriad of technical rescue scenarios in the presence of 
contamination, it also suggests an overall lack on emphasis on any one threat, including a 
domestic nuclear detonation. The CBRN Response Enterprise’s singular focus on this 
threat implies that, while it may be only good at handling one variety of incident (which 
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may lead to a strategic gap in understanding the expectations of civil US&R authorities, as 
identified in Chapter II), it does so very well. 
Still, there is room for improvement. While possessing the proper strategic 
alignment on paper, the CBRN Response Enterprise must ensure it is prepared physically 
to integrate and follow the lead of civil US&R authorities during an actual incident. To 
achieve this end, enterprise leadership should consider the results of the research interviews 
outlined in Chapter III. 
2. Operations 
Hazards of secondary collapse, nuclear fallout, and fire must be effectively 
addressed at the operations level of incident response for lifesaving US&R efforts to be 
effective in a post-nuclear detonation environment. Further, since the CBRN Response 
Enterprise’s mission is supportive in nature, its efforts to achieve these ends must align 
with those of civil US&R authorities. After all, according to Kenny, these authorities—
especially at the federal level of government—expect the enterprise to integrate with and 
provide manpower to their forces, such as in the form of “super squads.” 
Theoretically, the CBRN Response Enterprise is operationally well prepared to 
address the hazards of secondary collapse and nuclear fallout during a domestic nuclear 
detonation. As previously stated, Title 32 National Guard search and extraction forces 
receive training in rope, confined space, and structural collapse rescue operations.216 
Additionally, Title 10 search and rescue forces receive training to become full structural 
collapse rescue technicians.217 This training is modeled after the same training received 
by civilian US&R responders. 
However, some serious gaps exist in operational planning and doctrine that affect 
the enterprise’s ability to address the threat of fire. Foremost, unlike the National US&R 
Response System—that pulls its members largely from fire departments—the CBRN 
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Response Enterprise is composed of soldiers and airmen, who may or may not have any 
structural firefighting training.218 While such training is not recommended by the NFPA 
to certify structural collapse rescuers at any level, fire is a common hazard at every 
structural collapse event.219 Furthermore, the threat of fire is exponentially larger after a 
nuclear detonation.220 While it is not necessarily the role or expectation of collapse 
rescuers to engage in fire suppression activities, this lack of firefighting knowledge could 
render enterprise US&R responders ineffective. As Kaszeta points out, “The structural-
collapse problem may be even more of a safety hazard in situations where CBRN/
HAZMAT response-team members may not come from a fire-service background…”221 
While Kaszeta made this statement in the context of the collapse problem, it reveals an 
additional role structural firefighting experience plays in US&R after CBRN events. 
Furthermore, Title 32 search and extraction forces do not possess the necessary 
respiratory PPE to conduct US&R operations in the moderate damage zone—as the 
proposed plan of the National US&R Response System intends—under the threat of 
fire.222 Again, while it may not be expected that these forces engage in fire suppression 
efforts, fire and the toxic byproducts of combustion will more than likely be present in this 
area of operation. According to the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the Response 
and Recover Federal Interagency Operations Plans, “The Moderate Damage Zone is most 
at risk for firestorms caused by nuclear flash and secondary ignition sources.”223  
Search and extraction elements are only equipped with air purifying respirators and 
powered air-purifying respirators; these respirators are not suitable for respiratory 
protection in active fire environments, with their efficacy questionable even in post-fire 
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environments.224 This lack of suitability occurs because CBRN filters are generally not 
effective against carbon monoxide, one of the most prevalent toxic gases in fire smoke.225 
Only Title 10 search and rescue forces are equipped with self-contained breathing 
apparatuses, but they are intended to arrive later in the event and theoretically committed 
to the light damage zone.226 
3. Tactics 
The factors of work/rest cycles, diminished dexterity and vision, and stay times are 
tactical issues for military US&R support in post-nuclear detonation environments, and the 
CBRN Response Enterprise’s ability to address them has a split scorecard. In reaching this 
conclusion, work/rest cycles and stay times were paired for analysis, as both are functions of 
time. Consequently, the challenges of diminished dexterity and vision are in a category of 
their own.  
On the matter of work/rest cycles and stay times, the enterprise is well prepared to 
perform and support civil authorities. Since both mandate the rotation of response personnel, 
they require large numbers of rescuers for proper implementation. At approximately 18,795 
soldiers and airmen strong, with 27 search and extraction teams at the Title 32 level alone, the 
enterprise has more than enough rescuers to sustain US&R efforts under these constraints in 
a post-nuclear detonation environments.227 
However, the challenge of diminished dexterity and vision presents a serious gap in 
tactical ability for the enterprise’s US&R elements, specifically in the realm of training. As 
previously stated, US&R is a highly technical discipline that requires a high degree of 
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situational awareness, without the added limitations incurred by the use of CBRN PPE. As 
such, it requires a high degree of mastery for rescuers to perform safely and optimally, which 
can only be obtained through rigorous training and experience.228 
Despite these requirements, the required continuing education for the enterprise’s 
US&R elements is generally limited to collective training events, 24–36-month external 
evaluations, and large exercises.229 Furthermore, initial, individual training is extremely 
abbreviated, particularly on the Title 32 side of the enterprise. While meeting all the training 
requirements established by NFPA 1006: Standard for Technical Rescue Personnel 
Professional Qualifications for rope, confined space, and structural collapse rescue 
operations, the Extractor 1 course is only 12 days in duration.230 This course is extremely 
brief compared to many civilian fire service-based US&R and technical rescue courses. 
Compared to civil US&R authorities, it could be argued that the DOD’s CBRN-
centric doctrine compensates for some of the aforementioned-noted pitfalls. This comparison 
is reflected in the CBRN Response Enterprise’s approach to US&R, with search and 
extraction and search and rescue training geared primarily towards rescuing victims in 
collapsed structures after a nuclear detonation.231 However, despite this emphasis in mission, 
the performance and evaluation of US&R skills in CBRN PPE is not mentioned in Training 
Circular Number 3–37.51: Urban Search and Rescue, the chief US&R training document for 
the enterprise.232 In fact, the Extractor 1 course does not offer search and extraction soldiers 
and airmen the opportunity to practice US&R skills while donning CBRN PPE.233 Given the 
limitations presented by such PPE, this exclusion is a major oversight in tactical preparedness. 
While civilian responders take an all-hazards approach to US&R, they have the benefits of 
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more frequent continuing education and making real-world US&R responses. Such 
experience would prove invaluable to those operators while performing US&R in CBRN PPE. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Post-nuclear detonation environments present the hazards of secondary collapse, 
nuclear fallout, and fire to US&R responders, and each must be properly addressed for US&R 
efforts to be successful after such an incident. Particularly, protection from the hazard of 
nuclear fallout presents the added complexity of CBRN PPE usage, which limits responder 
dexterity and vision and requires work/rest cycles, and radiation exposure, which requires the 
use of stay times.234 Given these additional layers of complexity, it is necessary to assess the 
CBRN Response Enterprise’s ability to overcome these challenges in fulfilling its supportive 
mission following a domestic nuclear detonation. 
To accomplish this assessment, the enterprise can be evaluated at the strategic, 
operations, and tactical levels of incident response. At the strategic level, it is properly oriented 
to address these challenges, but it should study and understand the stated needs of civil US&R 
authorities as described in Chapter III. At the operations level, it is not prepared to handle the 
threat of fire. Finally, at the tactical level, its large numbers make it well equipped to handle 
the challenges imposed by stay times and work/rest cycles, but training deficiencies make it 
ill prepared to address the decreases in rescuer dexterity and vision caused by CBRN PPE 
usage. 
However, the challenges presented to military US&R support efforts by post-nuclear 
detonation environments are only a single piece of this research project. With this in mind, 
the next section of this thesis synthesizes the implications of this chapter, as well as the others, 
into a final conclusion. Additionally, it addresses the limitations to this research, and it makes 
policy recommendations for the CBRN Response Enterprise based upon its findings. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
To be fully effective, change must be implemented at the level of 




The previous chapters of this thesis set out to determine how the DOD can 
maximize the employment of existing CBRN Response Enterprise US&R capabilities to 
support civil authority–directed lifesaving efforts following a domestic nuclear detonation. 
In achieving this end, Chapter II outlined and analyzed the domestic nuclear detonation 
response architecture, which revealed gaps in the DOD’s understanding of the needs of 
civil US&R authorities after such an event. In an effort to bridge these gaps, Chapter III 
investigated the expectations of these authorities through research interviews. Chapter IV 
analyzed the CBRN Response Enterprise’s ability to overcome the challenges of post-
nuclear detonation environments to meet these expectations, a theme that emerged from 
the interviews. 
Subsequently, this chapter aggregates the findings of the previous chapters to draw 
conclusions and deliver recommendations to the DOD. Additionally, it acknowledges the 
limitations of this study, and it identifies areas worthy of further research. By following 
these recommendations, the CBRN Response Enterprise can begin to maximize the 
employment of its existing US&R elements to achieve its DSCA mission after a domestic 
nuclear attack. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
As with any scientific inquiry, this research has limitations. The foremost limitation 
to this study is the sample set of the research interviews, particularly in regards to local 
civil authorities. While the three local response officials selected for the interviews are a 
good representation of the knowledge base of the greater local response community, they 
are not exhaustive. Just as perceptions, cultures, policies, doctrine, and response models 
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can vary widely over large geographical areas, so can the needs and expectations of local 
civil authorities. While the data gathered is adequate for making recommendations, this 
limitation must be remembered when considering these conclusions. 
Furthermore, the implications of this research are limited primarily to urban areas, 
as the local responders interviewed were only selected from large cities. While unlikely, it 
is possible for a domestic nuclear detonation to occur in a more suburban or rural location. 
However, the needs and expectations of response agencies can also differ greatly between 
geographical settings. Therefore, it should not be assumed that expectations of local civil 
US&R authorities expressed in this study are reflective of those in suburban or rural places, 
and this topic may be worthy of further research. 
Additionally, in-depth analysis of nuclear weapons effects modeling is beyond the 
scope of this study. Consequently, additional factors could be considered when evaluating 
the relevance of existing doctrine and characterizing post-nuclear detonation environments. 
Furthermore, the conclusions of many relevant modeling studies are contradictory. For 
instance, the effect of thermal radiation and phenomenon of mass fire has been the subject 
of spirited debate.235 To address this limitation, this study takes a very general approach 
to hazard mitigation. 
Finally, far more complexities are presented to US&R efforts by post-nuclear 
detonation environments than could be addressed by this study. While the most pressing 
and prevalent factors are covered, others are worthy of further research. For example, with 
the National US&R Response System elevating its radiation dose limit for its responders 
to 50 roentgen equivalent man, a disparity could occur in dose limits between federal civil 
US&R authorities and the CBRN Response Enterprise.236 
C. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
A domestic nuclear detonation would arguably constitute America’s worst day and 
challenge even the best-devised emergency response plans. As such, mitigation would 
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require a whole-of-government solution and DOD’s involvement, especially in the realm 
of US&R, as it would present unique challenges and overwhelm civilian responders. Put 
simply, federal and local authorities could not tackle such challenges without military aid. 
Still, civil response agencies have the authority to coordinate any such effort at both 
the federal and local levels of government, so it is imperative for the DOD to embrace its 
supportive role.237 To this end, it must have a better understanding of the expectations of 
civil US&R authorities after such an event. Subsequently, the CBRN Response Enterprise 
must be tailored to meet these expressed needs. Doing so would allow the civil response 
agencies to become a force multiplier for civil US&R authorities, which would empower 
them to lead the effort to save lives after a domestic nuclear detonation. 
For federal civil US&R authorities, according to Sanders, Neal, and Kenny, force 
multiplication means providing capable manpower to sustain US&R efforts in a post-
nuclear detonation environment. These responders are well trained and highly experienced 
and are very capable of coordinating federal response efforts. However, Sanders and Neal 
stated that the restrictions of work/rest cycles and stay times make US&R extremely labor 
intensive under such conditions. Consequently, they expect the enterprise to integrate into 
their response to maintain their battle rhythm. 
On the other hand, local civil US&R authorities are less sure of their needs and 
expectations. They have far less exposure to the CBRN Response Enterprise’s US&R 
elements, and they dedicate fewer planning resources to domestic nuclear detonation 
response. Regardless, Jones, Hoffman, and Cooper said that they are also highly trained 
and experienced responders, and they are open to military aid. 
Based upon this feedback, the DOD can begin to reshape its US&R response 
doctrine. However, even with this deeper understanding, the enterprise must address 
certain conditions presented by post-nuclear detonation environments to render aid 
effectively. These conditions include the threat of fire and added challenges to the 
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performance of US&R skills while utilizing PPE, which can be mitigated by changes in 
gear and training. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based upon the findings of this research, the DOD should consider the following 
recommendations. 
1. Consider Embracing the “Super Squad” Concept 
As the research interviews with Sanders, Neal, and Kenny revealed, federal civil 
US&R authorities of the National US&R Response System expect the CBRN Response 
Enterprise’s US&R elements to serve as force multipliers for their life-saving efforts 
following a domestic nuclear detonation. Such efforts are labor intensive and require large 
numbers of responders to meet the demands of stay times and work/rest cycles.238 At 
approximately 18,795 soldiers and airmen strong, the enterprise is well prepared to meet 
this expectation.239 
However, the professional rescuers of the National US&R Response System are 
highly trained and experienced, especially in comparison to the US&R personnel of the 
CBRN Response Enterprise. As such, Sanders, Neal, and Kenny indicated that they intend 
to fulfill their coordinating role during such an incident, and they expect the enterprise to 
integrate with their responders. As suggested by Kenny, one potential way is through the 
formal development and adoption of the “super squad” concept, which involves the direct 
embedding of enterprise US&R personnel into National US&R Response System rescue 
squads. 
2. Emphasize Operations-level (Level I) US&R Skills 
As previously established, US&R is a highly technical discipline that requires a 
high degree of competence to perform safely and successfully, and mastery can take years 
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of training and experience.240 With the added complexities presented to US&R efforts by 
post-nuclear detonation environments, it should not be assumed that US&R-capable 
soldiers and airmen will be able to perform at an advanced level after a nuclear attack. 
Therefore, the enterprise should emphasize the mastery of operations-level (level I) US&R 
skills among all of its US&R elements. 
This is not to suggest that technician-level (level II) training should be completely 
discarded, as higher levels of training and understanding certainly contribute to a mastery 
of these skills. However, current training plans are not conducive to maintaining advanced 
skillsets. Furthermore, with improved integration with National US&R Response System, 
they may not be necessary. 
3. Emphasize Wide Area Search Training 
The enterprise should also place greater emphasis on wide area search training, as 
wide area search is relatively less technical in nature, more suited for light damage zone 
operations, and a potential gap in preparedness and planning for civil US&R authorities, 
as also noted in an interview with Sanders.241 With a large number of personnel, the 
enterprise is well equipped to fill this void. 
4. Require Soldiers and Airmen to Practice US&R Skills in CBRN PPE 
during Initial, Individual Training 
Currently, the Extractor I and Rescuer Courses are taught strictly in accordance 
with NFPA 1006: Standard for Technical Rescue Personnel Professional 
Qualifications.242 However, outside of confined space rescue skills, this standard does not 
require students to perform US&R skills in CBRN PPE.243 Considering the limitations on 
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dexterity and vision incurred by PPE, CBRN Response Enterprise soldiers and airmen 
should have the opportunity to practice relevant US&R skills in full PPE during initial 
training.244 
5. Issue Self-contained Breathing Apparatuses to all CBRN Response 
Enterprise US&R Elements 
While the likelihood of a mass fire event after a nuclear attack is unclear, the 
presence of fire hazards in collapsed buildings and post-nuclear detonation environments 
is certain.245 Further, Title 32 US&R elements of the CBRN Response Enterprise have the 
potential to be deployed in the moderate damage zone, where fire is certain to be 
present.246 Regardless, only the Title 10 US&R elements are equipped with self-contained 
breathing apparatuses, which are the appropriate respiratory protection to mitigate smoke 
exposure.247 Given the prevalence of fire in this environment, all enterprise US&R forces 
should have immediate access to self-contained breathing apparatuses. 
6. Improve Communication with Federal and Local Civil US&R 
Authorities 
Across all levels of incident response, the CBRN Response Enterprise’s US&R 
capabilities and response doctrine have been misconstrued. Consequently, gaps have 
occurred in response plans, as highlighted in Chapter II. Since DSCA is the DOD’s 
mandate, it bears the responsibility for engaging these authorities and rectifying any 
misunderstandings.248 
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Furthermore, the DOD should be more engaging with local-level responders. From 
the research interviews, it was apparent that local US&R authorities have far less 
interaction with the enterprise than their federal counterparts do. Consequently, Jones, 
Hoffman, and Cooper, struggled to articulate their expectations of the DOD, as they had 
little understanding of its capabilities. Again, it is the DOD’s responsibility to rectify this 
problem, and it should do so quickly. As Cooper of Las Vegas Fire & Rescue pointed out 
during his interview, the immediate aftermath of domestic nuclear detonation is not the 
ideal time to begin fostering a professional partnership. 
The Mobile Education & Training Team is one potential model the DOD can 
consider for engaging these authorities, as outlined in a 2008 Naval Postgraduate School 
thesis by Steven Osterholzer. Upon researching ways NORTHCOM could improve its 
outreach initiatives with stakeholders and response partners, Osterholzer concluded, “A 
Mobile Education & Training Team, consisting of subject-matter experts from 
NORTHCOM Headquarters, should travel to stakeholder locations to execute a customized 
education package for its critical stakeholders.”249 Employing this approach, such a team 
could be used to educate local civil US&R authorities about the capabilities of the CBRN 
Response Enterprise. 
E. CONCLUSION 
To maximize the use of existing CBRN Response Enterprise US&R capabilities to 
support civil authority–directed lifesaving efforts following a domestic nuclear detonation, 
the DOD must understand these authorities’ expectations of its US&R elements. To 
achieve this end, research interviews were conducted with federal and local civil US&R 
authorities. As a result, according to Sanders, Neal, and Kenny, it was discovered that 
federal authorities expect the enterprise to serve as a force multiplier. Conversely, Jones, 
Hoffman, and Cooper said that local authorities are largely unaware of the enterprise’s 
US&R capabilities, but will be more reliant on DOD support. 
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Additionally, to meet these expectations, the CBRN Response Enterprise must be 
capable of overcoming the challenges presented to US&R efforts by post-nuclear 
detonation environments. These challenges include the hazards of secondary collapse, 
nuclear fallout, and fire.250 More specifically, mitigation tactics for the hazard of nuclear 
fallout add the complexities of work/rest cycles, diminished dexterity and vision, and stay 
times.251 Upon analysis, the enterprise needs to improve its capabilities to address the 
threat of fire and the added complexities incurred by CBRN environments. 
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APPENDIX. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
The following were the questions asked, in order:  
1. How often do your urban search and rescue units conduct training for 
structural collapse events? 
2. How often do your urban search and rescue units conduct training on wide 
area search techniques? 
3. What planning and preparation has your organization done in regards to 
urban search and rescue during a nuclear detonation response? 
4. How will your organization employ urban search and rescue personnel and 
equipment in contaminated areas during a nuclear detonation response? 
5. How do CBRN Response Enterprise urban search and rescue capabilities 
fit into your organization’s nuclear detonation response plans? 
6. What are your organization’s expectations of CBRN Response Enterprise 
urban search and rescue personnel during a nuclear detonation response? 
7. How does your organization plan to incorporate CBRN Response 
Enterprise urban search and rescue capabilities to best help achieve 
nuclear detonation response objectives?  
8. How will your organization employ CBRN Response Enterprise urban 
search and rescue personnel to augment life-saving urban search and 
rescue efforts during a nuclear detonation response? 
9. What specific urban search and rescue tasks would your organization 
assign to CBRN Response Enterprise urban search and rescue personnel 
during a nuclear detonation response? 
10. How would your organization employ CBRN Response Enterprise 
operations-level urban search and rescue personnel differently from 
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technician-level urban search and rescue personnel to augment life-saving 
search and rescue efforts during a nuclear detonation response? 
11. What urban search and rescue tasks would your organization assign to 
CBRN Response Enterprise urban search and rescue personnel during a 
nuclear detonation response? 
12. How would your organization employ CBRN Response Enterprise urban 
search and rescue personnel in areas experiencing mass fire events during 
a nuclear detonation response? 
13. What kind of training has your organization found would best prepare 
CBRN Response Enterprise urban search and rescue personnel to support 
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